With the British Army in The Holy Land | Page 3

long
and vulnerable line of communications, and with little or no available
fresh water. The defenders, operating along the line of the Suez Canal,
would be close to their base, with admirable communications, both
lateral and to the rear, and with the rich cultivated lands of Egypt on
which to draw for supplies, whilst their supply of fresh water would be
unlimited.
The boundary line between Egypt and Palestine in 1914 ran from Rafa,

on the Mediterranean, to the head of the Gulf of Akaba, the
north-eastern arm of the Red Sea. This line runs right across the desert
and is distant about 120 miles from the Suez Canal. At first sight the
boundary seems ideal, and in so far as the defence of Egypt alone was
concerned, it left little or nothing to be desired. But, as subsequent
events proved, this line was not good enough to safeguard the defences
of the Canal.
On the outbreak of war, in August, 1914, between Germany and
Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Great Britain, France, Russia
and Belgium on the other, the garrison of Egypt was augmented by
troops sent out from England and India and from Australia. The Suez
Canal, through which vast numbers of troops were passing, was of vital
importance to the communications of the allies, and was strongly
guarded accordingly. Two months later (November 5), Turkey threw in
her hand with the Central Powers. One of the baits held out by
Germany to induce the Turks to enter the struggle, was a promise that
they should be restored to complete supremacy in Egypt. With the
entering of Turkey into the war, and her open threats to invade Egypt,
the protection of that country and of the Canal became a matter of
extreme urgency.
The policy of defence adopted was that of making the line of the Canal
the line of resistance. A large portion of the low-lying desert to the
north-east of the Canal was flooded, so as to render approach by that
direction impossible. Warships took up stations in the Canal itself,
while naval patrol launches took over the duty of guarding the Bitter
Lakes. The troops detailed for the defence of the Canal itself were
entrenched upon the western side, with reserves concentrated at points
of tactical importance. In this way full advantage was taken of the
lateral communications on the western side of the Canal, while it was
thought that the difficulties of crossing the desert on the eastern side
would make approach by the Turks well-nigh impossible.
Meanwhile, the Turk was not letting the grass grow under his feet.
Whether the Germans ever intended to pay the price for Turkish
adhesion by sending a strong enough force to make the invasion of

Egypt practicable is open to doubt. The Turkish rank and file were
certainly led to believe that a serious invasion of Egypt was intended.
But it is much more likely that the object of the Germans was to detain
as large a British force as possible in Egypt and thus prevent their
taking part in the fighting in France. A secondary object may have been
to render the Suez Canal temporarily impassable. Whatever may have
been the chestnuts that Germany hoped to get out of the fire, it was
clear that Turkey was willing to act as catspaw, and attempt a foolhardy
invasion of Egypt. Consequently, the construction of a new military
railway in Syria was put in hand, and by January, 1915, the Turks had
formed advanced posts at Auja, on the frontier, and also at Kosseima,
El Arish, and Khan Epenus in the desert. The problem of water supply
has always presented a difficulty to armies crossing this waterless
desert. There are a certain number of reservoirs and cisterns which hold
up water during the rains. In the winter time these would be full. The
Turk is less particular about the water which he drinks than the white
man, and doubtless he could, to some extent, be supplied from some of
the brackish pools in the desert, with water that no one would think of
offering to a British soldier.
The light pontoons that the Turks dragged across the desert for crossing
the Canal are said to have been used for carrying water during certain
stages of the advance. Suffice it to say that the Turks did succeed in
solving the water problem, and in crossing the desert with a force of
some considerable strength.
On the 3rd February, 1915, the threatened attack materialized. Before
dawn, some of the light pontoons which the Turks had brought with
them, were launched on the Canal. These were manned, while other
Turks deployed along the eastern bank and opened fire to cover the
crossing. The troops defending this portion of the Canal, mostly Indians,