With the British Army in The Holy Land | Page 2

Egypt. That country had for many centuries
formed an integral part of the Turkish Empire. But she had been rapidly
slipping from the grasp of the Turk. Early in the nineteenth century
Mohamed Ali had effectually thrown off the Turkish yoke. True, the
Turkish suzerainty remained; but that authority was little more than
nominal and was represented by an annual money tribute paid to the
Porte by the Khedive out of the revenues of Egypt.
Both France and England had large financial interests in Egypt,
especially after the construction of the Suez Canal, which was opened
for traffic in 1869.

The Suez Canal, in fact, became of vital importance to Great Britain.
By a stroke of policy the British Government acquired the shares of the
almost bankrupt Khedive, Ismail Pasha, and thus had a holding in the
company worth several million pounds. But far more important to
Britain was the position of the Canal as the great artery of the British
Empire, the most vulnerable point on the short sea route to India. Thus
Britain became directly concerned in the affairs of Egypt, in its internal
administration to secure peace within, and in its military defence to
secure the country in general, and the Canal zone in particular, from
invasion by a foreign enemy.
But the affairs of Egypt were in a most unsatisfactory condition. The
army was wholly unreliable, and extravagance in high places had
brought the exchequer to the verge of bankruptcy. In 1882 matters
reached a crisis. A revolution broke out, headed by Arabi Pasha, and
the situation looked desperate. Joint naval and military action by
Britain and France was proposed, but the French ships sailed away and
left Britain with a free hand. The British fleet bombarded the Forts at
Alexandria and a military force, based on the Suez Canal, was landed at
Ismailia. This force completely defeated the army of Arabi Pasha at
Tel-el-Kebir, put down the rebellion, and restored the government of
the then Khedive, Tewfik Pasha. But the Khedivial government had
been unable to cope with the rebellion single-handed; it had only been
restored to power by British arms; it could not hope to retain that power
unless continuously backed by the power of Britain.
From this time forward, whether she liked it or not, Britain found
herself effectually saddled with the direction of the government of
Egypt. In this position she became more fully confirmed by the
Anglo-Egyptian military operations against the Soudan in 1885, under
Gordon, and in 1898, under Kitchener. Outstanding differences with
France were dispelled on the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente
Cordiale, and Britain was left virtually mistress of Egypt.
Let us look for a minute at the military geography of Egypt,
particularly with regard to the security of her frontiers from invasion.
Egypt consists, or prior to the seventies consisted, of the Nile, its valley

and delta, and the country rendered fertile by that river. On either side
of this fertile belt is dry, barren desert. On the north is the
Mediterranean Sea, and on the south the tropical Soudan. Thus, in the
hands of a power that holds the command of the sea, Egypt is well
adapted for defence. The tropical Soudan makes a well-nigh impossible
line of advance for a large hostile force from the south, and the routes
of approach from the east and from the west, across the waterless
deserts, present obstacles scarcely less formidable. Since the seventies,
however, another important factor has entered the problem, namely, the
Suez Canal and the area of cultivation and civilization which has
sprung up along its banks. The large amount of fresh water required for
the maintenance of the Canal, for the use of the towns that have sprung
up along its banks, and for the existence of the large population which
the Canal has attracted, is brought by a Canal known as the Sweet
Water Canal, from the river Nile. This Sweet Water Canal, and the
piped services which it supplied, were, in 1914, wholly upon the
western or Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. This western side was also
well provided with communications. Trunk railways connected Ismailia,
at the centre of the Canal, with Cairo and Alexandria, and lateral
railways, running along the whole length of the Canal, connected it
with Port Said and Suez.
Although, as was subsequently discovered, the problem of defending
the Suez Canal was by no means the same as that of defending Egypt,
the problems may, at first sight, appear identical. An enemy force
moving from Palestine against the Suez Canal and Egypt, would have
to cross a comparatively waterless desert for a distance of over a
hundred miles. On coming into collision with the defenders of the
Canal, such an enemy would be operating far from his base, with a