With the British Army in The Holy Land | Page 4

opened fire upon the pontoons, with the result that many of them were
sunk. Two of the pontoons, however, reached the western bank, and
their crews, numbering about twenty, surrendered. There was fighting
throughout the day, but no further crossing of the Canal. On the next
day the east bank was swept, with the result that a considerable party of
the enemy were captured. After this, the Turks withdrew, and marched

back to Palestine. This was the only time that a formed body of the
enemy succeeded in reaching the Canal. But they had shown that it was
possible for them to achieve the almost impossible, and thus they gave
the authorities responsible for the defence of Egypt much food for
thought.
The menace to Egypt was for a time delayed, though not wholly
removed, by the expedition against the Dardanelles.
To co-operate with our Russian allies, the British Government decided,
early in 1915, to attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The
strategic gains promised were highly attractive, and included--the
passage of arms and munitions from the allies to Russia in exchange for
wheat, the neutrality and possible adherence of the outstanding Balkan
States, the severing of communications between European and Asiatic
Turkey, the drawing off of Turkish troops from the theatres of the war,
and the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and ultimately
from Europe. Incidentally, it was considered, on the principle that the
best defensive is an offensive, that a thrust at the very heart of Turkey,
a threat against Constantinople itself, would afford the best means of
defending Egypt.
The story of the Dardanelles expedition has been often told, and
scarcely forms a part of this history, so a few words must suffice. In
February, 1915, we started by bombarding the forts with a few old
warships. The forts at the outer entrance were soon silenced, and early
in March, the warships moved up to the Narrows. On the 18th, a great
effort was made to reduce the forts about the Narrows; but it failed,
with the loss of three battleships and more than 2,000 men. This
demonstrated the fact that the Dardanelles could never be opened by
sea power alone, and, accordingly, amphibious operations became
necessary. An expeditionary force was assembled in Egypt, and
Mudros was selected as the advanced base. On April 25, landings were
effected on the extreme point of the Gallipoli Peninsula. In spite of
heroic attempts, we did little more than effect a precarious lodgment.
Further operations were necessary; additional divisions were brought
out from home; and on the night of the 6th/7th August, another landing

was effected at Suvla Bay. But the new plan was no more successful
than the old. Within a couple of days this force also had settled down to
a war of positions. Winter was approaching; our positions on the
peninsula would then become no longer tenable. No progress could be
made, and at length it was decided to evacuate. The Suvla Bay force
was withdrawn first; and the evacuation of the main body of troops was
completed on the 20th December. The withdrawal was carried out with
the same brilliance that had characterized the various landings, and
with so small a number of casualties that it was described as "an
achievement without parallel in the annals of war."
Many of the regiments that fought against the Turks at Gallipoli were
withdrawn, directly or indirectly to Egypt, and subsequently met the
Turk again during the advance into Palestine. Included among these
were the 10th, 52nd, 53rd and 54th Divisions, besides regiments of
Anzacs and Yeomanry. In so far as the Dardanelles operations aimed at
protecting Egypt, they were a success; for, while they were in progress,
no organized invasion of Egypt was attempted. But the evacuation had
the effect of liberating a large force of Turkey's best troops for
operations against Mesopotamia and Egypt.
It would be convenient to pause here and take stock of the military
situation in Egypt, in the light of over a year's experience of actual war.
In the first place, the Turks had disillusioned us as to the impossibility
of crossing the waterless desert, and had actually crossed it with a
considerable armed and organized force. They announced that what
they had effected had been nothing more than a reconnaissance. In any
case, they had shown us what they could do, and that, backed by the
resources of the Central Powers, there would be no insuperable obstacle
to their bringing a large and fully equipped army across the desert.
In the second place, we had discovered that the problems of defending
the Suez Canal and of defending Egypt were not identical. While the
Canal formed an admirable moat, an obstacle difficult to negotiate
when stoutly defended, and so a capital defensive