The War with the United States | Page 6

all the operations by land and sea together.
The character and numbers of the opposing forces have been even less
considered and even more misunderstood. Militia victories have been
freely claimed by both sides, in defiance of the fact that the regulars
were the really decisive factor in every single victory won by either
side, afloat or ashore. The popular notions about the numbers
concerned are equally wrong. The totals were far greater than is
generally known. Counting every man who ever appeared on either side,
by land or sea, within the actual theatre of war, the united grand total
reaches seven hundred thousand. This was most unevenly divided
between the two opponents. The Americans had about 575,000, the
British about 125,000. But such a striking difference in numbers was
matched by an equally striking difference in discipline and training.
The Americans had more than four times as many men. The British had
more than four times as much discipline and training.

The forces on the American side were a small navy and a swarm of
privateers, a small regular army, a few 'volunteers,' still fewer 'rangers,'
and a vast conglomeration of raw militia. The British had a detachment
from the greatest navy in the world, a very small 'Provincial Marine' on
the Lakes and the St Lawrence, besides various little subsidiary
services afloat, including privateers. Their army consisted of a very
small but latterly much increased contingent of Imperial regulars, a few
Canadian regulars, more Canadian militia, and a very few Indians. Let
us pass all these forces in review.
The American Navy. During the Revolution the infant Navy had begun
a career of brilliant promise; and Paul Jones had been a name to conjure
with. British belittlement deprived him of his proper place in history;
but he was really the founder of the regular Navy that fought so
gallantly in '1812.' A tradition had been created and a service had been
formed. Political opinion, however, discouraged proper growth.
President Jefferson laid down the Democratic party's idea of naval
policy in his first Inaugural. 'Beyond the small force which will
probably be wanted for actual service in the Mediterranean, whatever
annual sum you may think proper to appropriate to naval preparations
would perhaps be better employed in providing those articles which
may be kept without waste or consumption, and be in readiness when
any exigence calls them into use. Progress has been made in providing
materials for 74-gun ships.' [Footnote: A ship-of the-line, meaning a
battleship or man-of war strong enough to take a position in the line of
battle, was of a different minimum size at different periods. The
tendency towards increase of size existed a century ago as well as
to-day. 'Fourth-rates,' of 50 and 60 guns, dropped out of the line at the
beginning of the Seven Years' War. In 1812 the 74-gun three-decker
was the smallest man-of-war regularly used in the line of battle.] This
'progress' had been made in 1801. But in 1812, when Jefferson's
disciple, Madison, formally declared war, not a single keel had been
laid. Meanwhile, another idea of naval policy had been worked out into
the ridiculous gunboat system. In 1807, during the crisis which
followed the Berlin Decree, the Orders-in-Council, and the Chesapeake
affair, Jefferson wrote to Thomas Paine: 'Believing, myself; that
gunboats are the only water defence which can be useful to us, and

protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy, I am pleased with
everything which promises to improve them.' Whether 'improved' or
not, these gunboats were found worse than useless as a substitute for
'the ruinous folly of a navy.' They failed egregiously to stop Jefferson's
own countrymen from breaking his Embargo Act of 1808; and their
weatherly qualities were so contemptible that they did not dare to lose
sight of land without putting their guns in the hold. No wonder the
practical men of the Navy called them 'Jeffs.'
When President Madison summoned Congress in 1811 war was the
main topic of debate. Yet all he had to say about the Navy was
contained in twenty-seven lukewarm words. Congress followed the
presidential lead. The momentous naval vote of 1812 provided for an
expenditure of six hundred thousand dollars, which was to be spread
over three consecutive years and strictly limited to buying timber. Then,
on the outbreak of war, the government, consistent to the last, decided
to lay up the whole of their sea-going navy lest it should be captured by
the British.
But this final indignity was more than the Navy could stand in silence.
Some senior officers spoke their minds, and the party politicians gave
way. The result was a series of victories which, of their own peculiar
kind, have never been eclipsed. Not one American ship-of-the-line was
ever afloat during the war; and