only twenty-two frigates or smaller
naval craft put out to sea. In addition, there were the three little flotillas
on Lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain; and a few minor vessels
elsewhere. All the crews together did not exceed ten thousand men,
replacements included. Yet, even with these niggard means, the
American Navy won the command of two lakes completely, held the
command of the third in suspense, won every important duel out at sea,
except the famous fight against the Shannon, inflicted serious loss on
British sea-borne trade, and kept a greatly superior British naval force
employed on constant and harassing duty.
The American Privateers. Besides the little Navy, there were 526
privately owned vessels which were officially authorized to prey on the
enemy's trade. These were manned by forty thousand excellent seamen
and had the chance of plundering the richest sea-borne commerce in the
world. They certainly harassed British commerce, even in its own home
waters; and during the course of the war they captured no less than
1344 prizes. But they did practically nothing towards reducing the
British fighting force afloat; and even at their own work of
commerce-destroying they did less than one-third as much as the Navy
in proportion to their numbers.
The American Army. The Army had competed with the Navy for the
lowest place in Jefferson's Inaugural of 1801. 'This is the only
government where every man will meet invasions of the public order as
his own personal concern... A well-disciplined militia is our best
reliance for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them.'
The Army was then reduced to three thousand men. 'Such were the
results of Mr Jefferson's low estimate of, or rather contempt for, the
military character,' said General Winfield Scott, the best officer the
United States produced between '1812' and the Civil War. In 1808 'an
additional military force' was authorized. In January 1812, after war
had been virtually decided on, the establishment was raised to
thirty-five thousand. But in June, when war had been declared, less
than a quarter of this total could be called effectives, and more than half
were still wanting to complete.' The grand total of all American
regulars, including those present with the colours on the outbreak of
hostilities as well as those raised during the war, amounted to fifty-six
thousand. Yet no general had six thousand actually in the firing line of
any one engagement.
The United States Volunteers. Ten thousand volunteers were raised,
from first to last. They differed from the regulars in being enlisted for
shorter terms of service and in being generally allowed to elect their
own regimental officers. Theoretically they were furnished in fixed
quotas by the different States, according to population. They resembled
the regulars in other respects, especially in being directly under Federal,
not State, authority.
The Rangers. Three thousand men with a real or supposed knowledge
of backwoods life served in the war. They operated in groups and
formed a very unequal force--good, bad, and indifferent. Some were
under the Federal authority. Others belonged to the different States. As
a distinct class they had no appreciable influence on the major results
of the war.
The Militia. The vast bulk of the American forces, more than
three-quarters of the grand total by land and sea, was made up of the
militia belonging to the different States of the Union. These militiamen
could not be moved outside of their respective States without State
authority; and individual consent was also necessary to prolong a term
of enlistment, even if the term should come to an end in the middle of a
battle. Some enlisted for several months; others for no more than one.
Very few had any military knowledge whatever; and most of the
officers were no better trained than the men. The totals from all the
different States amounted to 456,463. Not half of these ever got near
the front; and not nearly half of those who did get there ever came into
action at all. Except at New Orleans, where the conditions were quite
abnormal, the militia never really helped to decide the issue of any
battle, except, indeed, against their own army. 'The militia thereupon
broke and fled' recurs with tiresome frequency in numberless
dispatches. Yet the consequent charges of cowardice are nearly all
unjust. The fellow-countrymen of those sailors who fought the
American frigates so magnificently were no special kind of cowards.
But, as a raw militia, they simply were to well-trained regulars what
children are to men.
American Non-Combatant Services. There were more than fifty
thousand deaths reported on the American side; yet not ten thousand
men were killed or mortally wounded in all the battles put together.
The medical department, like the commissariat and transport, was only
organized at the very last minute,
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