The War with the United States | Page 5

other's rights and difficulties;
and so they made for peace. The general current, however, was against
them, even before the Chesapeake affair; and several additional
incidents helped to quicken it afterwards. In 1808 the toast of the
President of the United States was received with hisses at a great public
dinner in London, given to the leaders of the Spanish revolt against
Napoleon by British admirers. In 1811 the British sloop-of-war Little
Belt was overhauled by the American frigate President fifty miles
off-shore and forced to strike, after losing thirty-two men and being
reduced to a mere battered hulk. The vessels came into range after dark;
the British seem to have fired first; and the Americans had the further
excuse that they were still smarting under the Chesapeake affair. Then,
in 1812, an Irish adventurer called Henry, who had been doing some
secret-service work in the United States at the instance of the Canadian
governor-general, sold the duplicates of his correspondence to
President Madison. These were of little real importance; but they added
fuel to the Democratic fire in Congress just when anti-British feeling
was at its worst.
The fourth cause of war, the desire to conquer Canada, was by far the
oldest of all. It was older than Independence, older even than the

British conquest of Canada. In 1689 Peter Schuyler, mayor of Albany,
and the acknowledged leader of the frontier districts, had set forth his
'Glorious Enterprize' for the conquest and annexation of New France.
Phips's American invasion next year, carried out in complete
independence of the home government, had been an utter failure. So
had the second American invasion, led by Montgomery and Arnold
during the Revolutionary War, nearly a century later. But the
Americans had not forgotten their long desire; and the prospect of
another war at once revived their hopes. They honestly believed that
Canada would be much better off as an integral part of the United
States than as a British colony; and most of them believed that
Canadians thought so too. The lesson of the invasion of the 'Fourteenth
Colony' during the Revolution had not been learnt. The alacrity with
which Canadians had stood to arms after the Chesapeake affair was
little heeded. And both the nature and the strength of the union between
the colony and the Empire were almost entirely misunderstood.
Henry Clay, one of the most warlike of the Democrats, said: 'It is
absurd to suppose that we will not succeed in our enterprise against the
enemy's Provinces. I am not for stopping at Quebec or anywhere else;
but I would take the whole continent from them, and ask them no
favours. I wish never to see peace till we do. God has given us the
power and the means. We are to blame if we do not use them.' Eustis,
the American Secretary of War, said: 'We can take Canada without
soldiers. We have only to send officers into the Provinces, and the
people, disaffected towards their own Government, will rally round our
standard.' And Jefferson summed it all up by prophesying that 'the
acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighbourhood of Quebec,
will be a mere matter of marching.' When the leaders talked like this, it
was no wonder their followers thought that the long-cherished dream of
a conquered Canada was at last about to come true.
CHAPTER II
OPPOSING FORCES
An armed mob must be very big indeed before it has the slightest

chance against a small but disciplined army.
So very obvious a statement might well be taken for granted in the
history of any ordinary war. But '1812' was not an ordinary war. It was
a sprawling and sporadic war; and it was waged over a vast territory by
widely scattered and singularly heterogeneous forces on both sides. For
this reason it is extremely difficult to view and understand as one
connected whole. Partisan misrepresentation has never had a better
chance. Americans have dwelt with justifiable pride on the frigate duels
out at sea and the two flotilla battles on the Lakes. But they have
usually forgotten that, though they won the naval battles, the British
won the purely naval war. The mother-country British, on the other
hand, have made too much of their one important victory at sea, have
passed too lightly over the lessons of the other duels there, and have
forgotten how long it took to sweep the Stars and Stripes away from the
Atlantic. Canadians have, of course, devoted most attention to the
British victories won in the frontier campaigns on land, which the other
British have heeded too little and Americans have been only too
anxious to forget. Finally, neither the Canadians, nor the
mother-country British, nor yet the Americans, have often tried to take
a comprehensive view of