The Public Orations of Demosthenes, vol 1 | Page 5

with Philip on the only terms which he would
accept--that each side should keep what it de facto possessed at the
time.
Demosthenes was generally in opposition to Eubulus and his party, of
which Aeschines (once an actor and afterwards a clerk, but a man of
education and great natural gifts) was one of the ablest members.
Demosthenes was inspired by the traditions of the past, but had a much
less vague conception of the moral to be drawn from them than had the
multitude. Athens, for him as for them, was to be the first state in
Hellas; she was above all to be the protectress of democracy
everywhere, against both absolutism and oligarchy, and the leader of
the Hellenes in resistance to foreign aggression. But, unlike the
multitude, Demosthenes saw that this policy required the greatest

personal effort and readiness for sacrifice on the part of every
individual; and he devotes his utmost energies to the task of arousing
his countrymen to the necessary pitch of enthusiasm, and of effecting
such reforms in administration and finance as, in his opinion, would
make the realization of his ideal for Athens possible. In the speeches
for the Megalopolitans and the Rhodians, the nature of this ideal is
already becoming clear both in its Athenian and in its Panhellenic
aspects. But so soon as it appeared that Philip, at the head of the
half-barbarian Macedonians, and not Athens, was likely to become the
predominant power in the Hellenic world, it was against Philip that all
his efforts were directed; and although in 346 he is practically at one
with the party of Eubulus in his recognition of the necessity of peace,
he is eager, when the opportunity seems once more to offer itself, to
resume the conflict, and, when it is resumed, to carry it through to the
end.
We have then before us the sharp antagonism of two types of
statesmanship. The strength of the one lies in the recognition of actual
facts, and the avoidance of all projects which seem likely, under
existing circumstances, to fail. The other is of a more sanguine type,
and believes in the power of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice to transform
the existing facts into something better, and to win success against all
odds. Statesmen of the former type are always attacked as unpatriotic
and mean-spirited; those of the latter, as unpractical and reckless. There
is truth and falsehood in both accusations: but since no statesman has
ever combined all the elements of statesmanship in a perfect and just
proportion, and since neither prudence and clear-sightedness, nor
enthusiastic and generous sentiment, can ever be dispensed with in the
conduct of affairs without loss, a larger view will attach little discredit
to either type. While, therefore, we may view with regret some of the
methods which both Demosthenes and Aeschines at times
condescended to use in their conflicts with one another, and with no
less regret the disastrous result of the policy which ultimately carried
the day, we need not hesitate to give their due to both of the contending
parties: nor, while we recognize that Eubulus and Phocion (his sturdiest
supporter in the field and in counsel) took the truer view of the
situation, and of the character of the Athenians as they were, need we
(as it is now fashionable to do) denounce the orator who strove with

unstinting personal effort and self-sacrifice to rouse the Athenians into
a mood in which they could and would realize the ideal to which they,
no less than he, professed their devotion.
But the difficulties in the way of such a realization were wellnigh
insuperable. Neither the political nor the military system of Athens was
adapted to such a policy. The Sovereign Assembly, though capable of
sensible and energetic action at moments of special danger, was more
likely to be moved by feeling and prejudice than by businesslike
argument, particularly at a time when the tendency of the best educated
and most intelligent men was to withdraw from participation in public
life; and meeting, as the Assembly did (unless specially summoned),
only at stated intervals, it was incapable of taking such rapid,
well-timed, and decisive action as Philip could take, simply because he
was a single man, sole master of his own policy, and personally in
command of his own forces. The publicity which necessarily attached
to the discussions of the Assembly was a disadvantage at a time when
many plans would better have been kept secret; and rapid modifications
of policy, to suit sudden changes in the situation, were almost
impossible. Again, while no subjects are so unsuited under any
circumstances for popular discussion as foreign and military affairs, the
absence in Athens of a responsible ministry greatly increased the
difficulties of her position. It is true that