The Public Orations of Demosthenes, vol 1 | Page 6

the Controller of the Festival
Fund (whose office gradually became more and more important) was
now appointed for four years at a time, while all other offices were
annual; and that he and his friends, and their regular opponents, were
generally ready to take the lead in making proposals to the Council or
the Assembly. But if they chose to remain silent, they could do so;[4]
no one was bound to make any proposal at all; and, on the other hand,
any one might do so. With such a want of system, far too much was left
to chance or to the designs of interested persons. Moreover, the
Assembly felt itself under no obligation to follow for any length of time
any lead which might be given to it, or to maintain any continuity or
consistency between its own decrees. In modern times, a minister,
brought into power by the will of the majority of the people, can reckon
for a considerable period upon the more or less loyal support of the
majority for himself and his official colleagues. In Athens the leader of
the moment had to be perpetually adapting himself afresh to the mood

of the Assembly, and even to deceive it, in order that he might lead at
all, or carry out the policy which, in his opinion, his country's need
required. It is therefore a remarkable thing that both Eubulus and
Demosthenes succeeded for many years in maintaining a line of action
as consistent as that taken by practical men can ever be.
The fact that the Council of Five Hundred, which acted as a standing
committee of the people, and prepared business for the Assembly and
was responsible for the details of measures passed by the Assembly in
general form, was chosen by lot and changed annually, as did
practically all the civil and the military officials (though the latter
might be re-elected), was all against efficiency and continuity of
policy.[5] After the system of election by lot, the most characteristic
feature of the Athenian democracy was the responsibility of statesmen
and generals to the law-courts.[6] Any citizen might accuse them upon
charges nominally limited in scope, but often serving in reality to bring
their whole career into question. Had it been certain that the courts
would only punish incompetence or misconduct, and not failure as such,
little harm would have resulted. But although there were very many
acquittals in political trials, the uncertainty of the issue was so great,
and the sentences inflicted upon the condemned so severe (commonly
involving banishment at least), that the liability to trial as a criminal
must often have deterred the statesman and the general from taking the
most necessary risks; while the condemnation of the accused had
usually the result of driving a really able man out of the country, and
depriving his fellow countrymen of services which might be urgently
required when they were no longer available.
The financial system was also ill adapted for the purposes of a people
constantly liable to war. The funds required for the bare needs of a time
of peace seem indeed to have been sufficiently provided from
permanent sources of income (such as the silver mines, the rent of
public lands, court fees and fines, and various indirect taxes): but those
needed for war had to be met by a direct tax upon property, levied ad
hoc whenever the necessity arose, and not collected without delays and
difficulties. And although the equipment of ships for service was
systematically managed under the trierarchic laws,[7] it was still
subject to delays no less serious. There was no regular system of
contribution to State funds, and no systematic accumulation of a

reserve to meet military needs. The raising of money by means of loans
at interest to the State was only adopted in Greece in a few isolated
instances:[8] and the practice of annually distributing surplus funds to
the people,[9] however necessary or excusable under the circumstances,
was wholly contrary to sound finance.
An even greater evil was the dependence of the city upon mercenary
forces and generals, whose allegiance was often at the call of the
highest bidder, and in consequence was seldom reliable. There is no
demand which Demosthenes makes with greater insistence, than the
demand that the citizens themselves shall serve with the army. At a
moment of supreme danger, they might do so. But in fact Athens had
become more and more an industrial state, and men were not willing to
leave their business to take care of itself for considerable periods, in
order to go out and fight, unless the danger was very urgent, or the
interests at stake of vital importance; particularly now that the length of
campaigns had become greater and the seasons exempted from military
operations shorter.