The Public Orations of Demosthenes, vol 1 | Page 4

(about 355) the Persian Empire itself was suffering from
recent disorders and revolutions, and the king had little leisure for
interfering in the affairs of Greece.
It was to the department of foreign and inter-Hellenic affairs that
Demosthenes principally devoted himself. His earliest political
speeches, however, were composed and delivered in furtherance of
prosecutions for the crime of proposing illegal legislation. These were
the speeches against Androtion (spoken by Diodorus in 355) and
against Leptines (in 354). Both these were written to denounce
measures which Demosthenes regarded as dishonest or unworthy of

Athenian traditions. In the former he displays that desire for
clean-handed administration which is so prominent in some of his later
speeches; and in the prosecution of Leptines he shows his anxiety that
Athens should retain her reputation for good faith. Both speeches, like
those of the year 352 against Timocrates (spoken by Diodorus), and
against Aristocrates (spoken by Euthycles), are remarkable for
thoroughness of argument and for the skill which is displayed in
handling legal and political questions, though, like almost all Athenian
forensic orations, they are sometimes sophistical in argument.
The first speech which is directly devoted to questions of external
policy is that on the Naval Boards in 354; and this is followed within
the next two years by speeches delivered in support of appeals made to
Athens by the people of Megalopolis and by the exiled democratic
party of Rhodes. From these speeches it appears that the general lines
of Demosthenes' policy were already determined. He was in opposition
to Eubulus, who, after the disastrous termination of the war with the
allies, had become the leading statesman in Athens. The strength of
Eubulus lay in his freedom from all illusion as to the position in which
Athens stood, in his ability as a financier, and in his readiness to take
any measures which would enable him to carry out his policy. He saw
that the prime necessity of the moment was to recruit the financial and
material strength of the city; that until this should be effected, she was
quite incapable of carrying on war with any other power; and that she
could only recover her strength through peace. In this policy he had the
support of the well-to-do classes, who suffered heavily in time of war
from taxation and the disturbance of trade. On the other hand, the
sentiments of the masses were imperialistic and militant. We gather
that there were plenty of orators who made a practice of appealing to
the glorious traditions of the past and the claim always made by Athens
to leadership among the Greek states. To buy off the opposition which
his policy might be expected to encounter, Eubulus distributed funds
freely to the people, in the shape of 'Festival-money', adopting the
methods employed before him by demagogues, very different from
himself, in order that he might override the real sentiments of the
democracy; and in spite of the large amounts thus spent he did in fact
succeed, in the course of a few years, in collecting a considerable sum
without resorting to extraordinary taxation, in greatly increasing the

navy and in enlarging the dockyards. For the success of this policy it
was absolutely necessary to avoid all entanglement in war, except
under the strongest compulsion. The appeals of the Megalopolitans and
the Rhodians, to yield to which would probably have meant war with
Sparta and with Persia, must be rejected. Even in dealing with Philip,
who was making himself master of the Athenian allies on the Thermaic
coast, the fact of the weakness of Athens must be recognized, and all
idea of a great expedition against Philip must be abandoned for the
present. At the same time, some necessary measures of precaution were
not neglected. It was essential to secure the route to the Euxine, over
which the Athenian corn-trade passed, if corn was not to be sold at
famine prices. For this purpose, therefore, alliance was made with the
Thracian prince, Cersobleptes; and when Philip threatened Heraeon
Teichos on the Propontis, an expedition was prepared, and was only
abandoned because Philip himself was forced to desist from his attempt
by illness. Similarly, when Philip appeared likely to cross the Pass of
Thermopylae in 352, an Athenian force was sent (on the proposal of
Diophantus, a supporter of Eubulus) to prevent him. The failure of
Eubulus and his party to give effective aid to Olynthus against Philip
was due to the more pressing necessity of attempting to recover control
of Euboea: it had clearly been their intention to save Olynthus, if
possible. But when this had proved impossible, and the attempt to form
a Hellenic league against Philip had also failed, facts had once more to
be recognized; and, since Athens was now virtually isolated, peace
must be made