The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 | Page 8

arbitration or to a
conference of the powers.
[English "White Paper," No. 39.]
No court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply
was a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor
indeed did either Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not.
They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the
assurances, calling the concessions "shams," and of this it is enough to
say that if Germany and Austria had accepted Servians reply as
sufficient, and Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus
made in the utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy
for Servia, and no general war. Indeed, both Russia and England
pledged their influence to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any
reasonable demand of Austria. The outstanding question, which Servia
agreed to arbitrate or leave to the powers, was the participation of
Austrian officials in the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult
problem. Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could
have been easily attained by having the neutral powers appoint a
commission of jurists to make such investigation.
On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to
use his good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To
this most reasonable request the answer and action of the German
Government was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to "pass
on" the suggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs added that as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from
Vienna there would be delay and difficulty in getting the time limit
extended, and
"he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government
_wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to take
military action. He also admitted that the Servian Government could

not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands_."
He added that Germany did not want a general war and "he would do
all in his power to prevent such a calamity."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 11 and 18.]
Immediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign
Minister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunely taken himself to
Ischl, where he remained until after the expiration of the time limit.
Access to him proved difficult, and the Russian Chargé at Vienna,
having lodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in
order to take no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl.
Nevertheless, Berchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital
was Germany's excuse for its failure to get the time limit extended.
If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of
peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin
to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely
pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace.
Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.
Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on
the morning of July 25 offered
"to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France,
Germany, and Italy."
[English "White Paper," No. 17.]
As Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the
fate of Servia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or
magnanimous?
On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including
Germany) should unite
"in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the

frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at Vienna and St.
Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view
I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would
no doubt gladly co-operate."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 24 and 25.]
To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied:
"First and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized
by the abstention of all the powers from intervention in it,"
but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,
"co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between Russia
and Austria."
[German "White Paper," Annex 13.]
This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the
difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference
with Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia.
Germany would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract
proposition mediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical
purposes the two things were indistinguishable.
How she "co-operated" we shall presently see.
All that Germany did on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was to
"pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but
subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any
indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally's
request for more time if it had ever been made?
The Austrian Foreign