The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 | Page 9

Minister, having launched the ultimatum,
absented himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna,
as already stated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request
verbally to the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would

submit it to Count Berchtold, but that he could predict with assurance
a categorical refusal. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely
advised that no time extension would be granted.
[Russian "Orange Paper," Nos. 11 and 12.]
Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A
little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to
preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.
A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging
diplomats. A timely word from the German Chancellor would have
saved the flower of the youth of Germany and Austria from perishing.
It would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to
a friendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.
Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,
and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily
arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could be
made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy
that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the
frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between
them," but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram
that he had received from the German Foreign Office that "once she
[Austria] had launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not
draw back."
[English "White Paper," No. 25.]
As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought
in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its
attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that
Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that
Germany approved its point of view,
"and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not allow
herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally."

This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to
civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,
whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it
carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war
may be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous
demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of
international morality.
On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter
into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in
common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. _To this
Austria never even replied._ The Russian Minister communicated this
suggestion to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the
hope that he would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our
proposal," but this did not accord with German policy, for on that day
the German Ambassador in Paris called upon the French Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and in reply to a similar suggestion that Germany
should suggest to Vienna to meet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit
which Servia had shown, the Ambassador answered that that "was not
possible in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the
Austro-Servian conflict."
On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in
London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe,
and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of
Europe, the German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that "it
is impossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference
with Servia," although it affected to accept "in principle" the policy of
mediation.
Germany's acceptance "in principle" of a policy which she in practice
thwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman
who was "for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its
enforcement."
[English "White Paper," No. 46.]
Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the powers even

for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the
German Ambassador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German
Secretary of State as saying
"that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could
hardly be expected to accept,"
thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust.
Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention to the
fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and marched
into that country
"it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being
reckless