The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 | Page 6

preserve the
peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.
[English "White Paper," No. 5; Russian "Orange Paper," No. 3.]
Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of
the German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris,
London, and St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian
Governments that
"the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government
cannot but be looked upon as justified."
[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]
How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum?
The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does
not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to

the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the
ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following
day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems
improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very
carefully prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the
23d unless it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the
ultimatum but also at least of the substance thereof.
While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of
Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the
communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable
assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at
Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a
concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury,
reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question
this conclusion for a moment.
The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to
anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these
demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to
France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance,
Austria has "recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means
must be left to it."
The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed
"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one the
settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia,
and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two
countries concerned,"
and he added that Germany strongly desired
"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power,
on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring
consequences impossible to measure."

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole
correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at
London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if
Germany was not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous
course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening
notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free
to make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of
the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?
[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]
A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated
Governments of Germany a confidential communication in which he
recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the
part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if
Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added
that
"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict,
she certainly has a right to do it,"
but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would
therefore alone--
"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the
Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European
powers wish to localize."
In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor
declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of
Servia by Austria. He says "_our closest interests therefore summon us
to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that
"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the
intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have
to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the
German Empire."

[German "White Paper," Annex 2.]
In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little attention
to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an individual,
can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art thou in health,
my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by