The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 | Page 5

threatening attitude_."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]
This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face of
Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a probability,
amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have committed itself
and Germany to the possibility of a European war without first
consulting Germany.
Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had
"private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the
text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and
telegraphed it to the German Emperor," and that the German
Ambassador himself "indorses every line of it." [English "White
Paper," No. 95.] As he does not disclose the source of his "private
information," this testimony would not by itself be convincing, but
when we examine Germany's official defense in the German "White
Paper," _we find that the German Foreign Office admits that it was
consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved
of Austria's course but literally gave her a carte blanche to proceed_.
This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of
Germany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote in extenso.
After referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the
German "White Paper" says:
"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not
be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the

monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the
border without taking action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government
advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the
matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement
with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she
might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the
movement in Servia directed against the existence of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval._ We were
fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of
Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question
and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally."
Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir
Edward Grey, states that on the preceding night (July 21) he had met
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was
made to a possible action by Austria.
"His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part
would have been made ere this. He insisted that the question at issue
was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there
should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those
two countries."
He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country
should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had
"on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister
emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations
should be put on a proper footing."
[English "White Paper," No. 2.]
Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a
position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but
to which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did
much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European
civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse

continuing through many centuries a United European State exists,
even though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that
Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against
Servia without interference from any other power, even though, as was
inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the
Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.
No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in
its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time
which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to
answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually
admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the
full text of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly
twenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to