The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 | Page 4

political
organizations of that country.
The question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, but whether having regard to the obligations
which Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she
proceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.
On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at
Serajevo. For nearly a month there was no action by Austria, and no
public statement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly
sympathized with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its
aged monarch, who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as years and
wretched in both."
The Servian Government had formerly disclaimed any complicity with
the assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen
implicated therein.

From time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired
intimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great
self-restraint and in the most pacific manner. In his speech to the
French Chamber of Deputies, Viviani says that Europe had in the
interval preceding July 23 express assurances from Austria that its
course would be moderate and conciliatory. Never was it even hinted
that Germany and Austria were about to apply in a time of profound
peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.
This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English "White Paper"
from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It is one
of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence. At the
time this letter was written it is altogether probable that Austria's
arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed
and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir Edward
Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had so little
knowledge of Austria's policy that he
"asked the German Ambassador today (July 20) if he had any news of
what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia." The German
Ambassador replied "that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to
take some step."
Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had
learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,
"in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the
suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be
cleared up."
The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia
could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first
suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the
German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he
told the German Ambassador that he
"assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until
they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded

presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial,"
and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.
[English "White Paper," No. 1.]
Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey,
on the theory that the true function of an Ambassador is "to lie for his
country," or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that
even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then
in progress.
The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey:
"The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to Servia was
preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz."
He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador
at Vienna--note the significance of the exception--not a single member
of the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and
that the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign
Office on July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum
had actually been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was
moderate. Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count
Berchtold's confidence.
[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1,
1914.]
No better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the
French President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles
from Paris, and the Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the
Austrian Archduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.
The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether
Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian
ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German
Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign

Affairs an express assurance that
"the German Government _had no knowledge of the text of the
Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised any
influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a