The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 | Page 3

the balance of power in Europe, is
suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and for
the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications
passed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to
prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and the
fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly, the
nature of the differences between the Governments involved. The
ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the
record that has been made up by the official communications which can,
therefore, be treated as documentary evidence in a litigated case.
A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public
opinion in the British and German "White Papers," the Russian
"Orange Paper," and the Belgian "Gray Paper," and the purpose of this
article is to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court
would render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus
submitted.
Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the
record as thus made up discloses, but also by the significant omissions
of documents known to be in existence.
The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show
any failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their
possession, _but the German "White Paper" on its face discloses the
suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet
failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession_.
We know from the German "White Paper"--even if we did not conclude
as a matter of irresistible inference--that many important
communications passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria,
and it is probable that some communications must also have passed
between those two countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing
position, owes to the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such
disclosure would probably show is indicated by her deliberate

conclusion that her allies had commenced an aggressive war, which
released her from any obligation under the Triple Alliance.
The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the
text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture.
Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully
exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such
mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such
mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the
secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.
Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the
refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat
the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"
"we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and
advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the
dignity of the Monarchy."
[German "White Paper."]
This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving
other diplomatic documents had only added the text of the advice
which it thus gave Vienna.
The same significant omission will be found when the same official
defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria
"to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again the text
is not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office
has given to the world. The communications, which passed between
that office and its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London,
are given in extenso, but among the twenty-seven communications
appended to the German official defense it is most significant that not a
single communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin
to Vienna and only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin.
This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of
secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although

professing to give the purport of a few of them.
Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its
possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world,
remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which
precipitated the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the
sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts.
Austria's Case Against Servia.
To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take
us outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts
and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.
Let us therefore suppose arguendo that our imaginary court would
commence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June
28, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian
sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in
the political activities either of the Servian Government or of