The Federalist | Page 6

SAFE with respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties,
as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense
and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications on the same
points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies,
will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the
variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and
independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests
which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention,
in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts
appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot
be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government,

the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved.
The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this
reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able,
if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors.
But the national government, not being affected by those local
circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves,
nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by
others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties
and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be
apprehended under one general government than under several lesser
ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the
people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national
government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort
than can be derived from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the
Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions
of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several
instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper
conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain
or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many
innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some
States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those
who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of

apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to
excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate
that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will
not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties
immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate
and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in
that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act
advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of
men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes
their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses.
The national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this
pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and
decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties
which threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State
or confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their
Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to
FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged
to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either
have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or
Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?
PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 4
The Same Subject