The Federalist | Page 7

Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign

Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to
by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show
that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also
be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by
the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from
FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST
causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing
themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it
need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes
of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war
when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and
objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for
personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or
support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of
other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead
him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and
interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war,
which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well
deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as
kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of
our relative situation and circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can

supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding
any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign
fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our
carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing
theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain
than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,
inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a
manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with
commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent,
because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the
circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our
merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages
which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of
their respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one
side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor
will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and
us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent
with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that
jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and
cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should
regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land
and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise
out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at

present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and
opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not
be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good
national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A
SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and
discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of
defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the
resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be
provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us
inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in
question, more competent than any other