The Federalist | Page 5

have always
thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform
attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons,
which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers.
They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct
confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to
foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union
in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I
sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen,
that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have
reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG
FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS."
PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST No. 3
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the
Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their
interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for
the high opinion which the people of America have so long and
uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly
united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for
all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which
appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become
convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY
seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation
to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and
consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it
precisely and comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE
KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first
in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore
proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion
that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords
them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from
abroad.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world
will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of
the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or
INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire
whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by
UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn
out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will
follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people
in a state of peace with other nations.
The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation
of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties
with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia,
are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also
extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with
respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of
neighborhood to attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the
laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by
three or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or
other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or
senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general
and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be
necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government,--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and
never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon
in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the
political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government
will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual
States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations,
as well as more