Story of the War in South Africa | Page 8

Meanwhile, on the 25th of September, Glencoe had been occupied by a
detachment from Ladysmith, while reinforcements were sent to the
latter. It had by this time been recognized that the attempt to hold the
more advanced positions, such as Newcastle and Laing's Nek, would
expose the forces so placed to the fate of isolation which afterward
befell Ladysmith. The course of both the Imperial and colonial
governments at this period {p.031} was much affected by a wish not to
precipitate hostile action on the part of the Boers; for, in general, war
was not desired by the British, and, in particular, they were as yet
unready. On the 28th, however, such definite and threatening
movements were reported that the Natal Ministry decided at all hazards
to call out the volunteers, although it had apprehended that this step
would be considered practically equivalent to a declaration of war.
The increase of force in Natal to 15,000 men determined the sending
out of an officer superior in rank to General Symons. Sir George White,
designated for this duty, reached Cape Town October 3, and in view of
the serious news he there received, proceeded at once to Durban. On
the 9th, the day the Boer ultimatum was issued, he had at
Pietermaritzburg an interview with the Governor, in which he
expressed his disapproval of the position at Glencoe--an opinion in
which other officers of rank present coincided. The Governor replied
that General Symons had thought it safe, even before the Indian
contingent arrived; that the step had been {p.032} taken to assure the
coal supply; and that to recede from it now would involve grave
political consequences, disheartening the loyal, and tending to
encourage a rising among the blacks and the disaffected Dutch.
Without changing his opinion as to the military error involved, Sir
George White resolved to allow the detachment to remain. The decision
thus taken finally constituted the British military situation in Natal
when the campaign opened; namely, an advanced detachment of three
or four thousand at Glencoe and Dundee, a main body of eight to ten
thousand at Ladysmith, with smaller posts guarding the
communications in rear of the latter.

The greater exposure of Natal, owing to its nearness to the Boer States,
had determined the concentration upon it of the bulk of the British
forces in South Africa, including the reinforcements so far ordered; by
the arrival of which it was expected that there would by the end of
October be 22,000 troops in South Africa. It was not till October 7 that
was issued the first order to mobilise, summoning 25,000 of the Army
Reserve to join the colours.
The {p.033} necessities of Natal left but scant numbers to Cape Colony,
which was comparatively of less consequence, because the points of
vital importance to Great Britain lay near the sea-coast, protected by
their mere remoteness from any speedy attack. On the far inland
borders of the colony the situation soon reduced itself to that with
which we were so long familiar. The four or five thousand men
available at the outbreak of the war for the defence of the long frontier,
extending over five hundred miles, from the Basutoland boundary to
Mafeking, were obliged by the necessities of the case to concentrate;
which they did at Mafeking and Kimberley. There they were speedily
invested; and, being thus held in check, the border country, including
the important railroad junctions of De Aar, Naauwport and Stormberg,
lay freely open to the enemy. The seriousness of this military condition
was much increased by the well-known political fact that the Dutch
population of the region sympathized more or less actively with the
Boers. In fact many of them, upon the opening of hostilities, crossed
the border {p.034} to join the forces of the Orange Free State.
On the 9th of October, 1899, the Transvaal Government presented an
ultimatum. After recounting the political grievances of which it
complained, it demanded that all points of mutual difference should be
settled by arbitration, or other peaceful means, that the British troops
near the Transvaal border should be withdrawn, that the recent
reinforcements be removed altogether from South Africa, and that
those still on the sea should not be landed. If a satisfactory answer were
not received by 5 P.M., October 11, the action of the British
Government would be regarded as a formal declaration of war. War
therefore may be considered as having been formally initiated by the
Transvaal, at the day and hour thus fixed.

For some time prior to the opening of hostilities, the armed men of both
the South African Republic and the Free State had been assembling in
force on their respective frontiers toward Natal; the latter less rapidly
than the former, its military preparation not having received as full
development