Story of the War in South Africa | Page 7

until sufficient
reinforcements from Great Britain should arrive to turn the scale. Under
such circumstances, correct military principle--and the Boers have had
good advisers--imperatively dictates that the belligerent so situated
must at once assume an active {p.026} offensive. By rapid and
energetic movement, while the opponent's forces are still separated,
every advantage must be seized to destroy hostile detachments within

reach, and to establish one's own front as far in advance of the great
national interests, as it can be reasonably hoped to maintain it with
communications unbroken. The line thus occupied must rest upon
positions so chosen that by their strength, natural and developed, it
shall be possible, when offence has to be exchanged for defensive
warfare, to impose to the utmost upon the invader both delay and loss;
for delay and loss mean lessening power, and only by causing such
diminution, greater relatively than his own, can the weaker hope
eventually to reverse the odds and win the game.
To this end, therefore, the Boers with sound military judgment at once
devoted themselves; and it is very likely that the surmise before quoted
was correct--in naming the Hex River Pass and Durban as their ultimate
objectives, to be reached by a swift advance. The latter was certainly
not an unreasonable hope, and it is possible that with {p.027} more
precise accuracy of combination, and an offensive more resolutely
sustained, they might have attained their purpose, through the mistaken
primary dispositions of the British, who, though recognizing
themselves to be for the time on the defensive, nevertheless, for
political reasons, advanced their front of operations to a point with
which, as it proved, they could not secure their communications. From
the worst consequences of this error they were saved by the gallantry
and skill with which advantage was taken of the defective co-operation
that marked the opening of the campaign by the Boers; and there can be
also little question that the wholesome respect for their fighting
qualities, thus established at the beginning of hostilities, had a most
beneficial effect for them, in discouraging attack by an enemy, who,
though brave and active, constitutionally prefers a waiting game to an
assault. Thus the ultimate fate of Ladysmith was settled in the fortnight
of operations that preceded the investment.
CHAPTER II
{p.028}
THE OPENING CAMPAIGN IN NATAL TO THE INVESTMENT
OF LADYSMITH (OCTOBER 11-NOVEMBER 2)

The evident exposure of Natal to the first and heaviest attack of the
enemy, and the necessity so to provide for its defence as to gain the
time necessary for reinforcements to arrive, engaged very early the
anxious attention of the Imperial and local authorities. The latter
especially felt the greater solicitude, which is natural to those whose
interests are immediately threatened. As early as May 25, before the
Bloemfontein Conference between Sir Alfred Milner and President
Kruger, the Natal Ministry notified Mr. Chamberlain that, owing to
Boer preparations across the border, the scattered British in the neck of
Natal were getting uneasy, and the Ministry itself nervous, at the
prospect of war. These representations were {p.029} repeated more
urgently in the middle of June, and a month later a request was made to
be confidentially informed of the proposed plan for defence. When this
was communicated, it appeared that General Sir Penn Symons,
commanding the Imperial troops in Natal (who afterward was the first
general officer killed in the war), considered that with the force then at
his disposal--something over 5,000 men of all arms--he could do no
more than hold the railroad as far as Hattingh Spruit, some five miles
north of Dundee, thereby protecting the collieries. To advance as far as
Newcastle he estimated would require 2,000 more, while to hold
Laing's Nek an addition of 5,600 would be needed.
These calculations, as is now known, fell far short of the necessities of
the case, but they sufficiently alarmed the Colonial Government, and
upon its remonstrance the British Cabinet, on August 3, decided to send
a reinforcement of 2,000 men.
On the 6th of September the Governor of Natal telegraphed at length to
London many menacing symptoms observable among the Boers,
{p.030} from which war was believed to be inevitable, and urged the
immediate despatch of troops sufficient to protect the colony. In
response to this, orders were issued on September 8 for 5,700 men to
start from India, and a small additional force from England itself,
making a total of from seven to eight thousand. These were expected to
arrive, and actually did for the most part arrive, between October 12
and 19, but even so were barely in time for the critical moment. They
were also only sufficient imperfectly to defend the colony, and were by

no means adequate to the offensive purpose which the Boer
Government, in its ultimatum, professed to discern.