Story of the War in South Africa | Page 9

as that of its ally, {p.035} who for some years had been
contemplating the possibility of war and accumulating material. The
Transvaalers came in rapidly, and already by the end of September had
gathered in numbers enough to warrant a speedy advance, before the
expected reinforcements from India should reach the enemy.
There is good reason to believe that it was intended to issue the
ultimatum on October 2, a week before its actual date; but there
occurred the unpleasant surprise of finding that neither in food nor in
ammunition were the supplies at hand sufficient to justify an immediate
forward movement. The defect of imperfect transport organisation,
inherent to hastily levied irregular troops, made itself at once felt. The
delay doubtless strengthened both parties, but, as usual, inured most to
the benefit of the one then on the defensive.
The first transports from India began to arrive on Tuesday, October 3,
on which day also the bulk of the Natal volunteers were expected to be
in their places; and in the six intervening days, preceding the ultimatum,
eleven {p.036} more steamers entered Durban with troops which were
at once despatched to the front. General Symons took command at
Dundee, Sir George White of the main body at Ladysmith.
The number of the Boers near at hand, and capable of being brought
against either of the British posts, was variously estimated at the
moment at from 8,000 to 13,000. There can be little doubt, however,
that the latter figure was much more nearly correct; that, in fact, on
October 11, the available force for the invasion rather exceeded than
fell short of the higher figure. Although precise information is still
lacking, there can be no doubt, from the character of the Boer
operations, that rapid subsequent accessions raised their numbers in
Natal to near 30,000 before the middle of November.
It is well here, on the verge of opening hostilities, to recall what has
before been indicated, that the projection of the narrow neck of Natal,

forming an acute salient angle between two hostile borders, gave
especial facilities to the Boers to combine their movements outside the
observation of the enemy, and {p.037} to strike suddenly either at one
of the British detachments, or at the railroad uniting them. Small bodies
began to make their appearance from both quarters almost immediately
after the expiry of the time set by the ultimatum, and for three or four
days the ordinary reports of outpost observations and shots exchanged
were continually received.
The uncertainty consequent upon these divergent demonstrations, some
of which from the Free State seemed to aim at the rear of Ladysmith
itself, was balanced and checked by the knowledge that the principal
Transvaal force had assembled round Zandspruit, in its own territory,
near the railroad, and some fifteen miles beyond Majuba Hill. There
was reason also to believe that the Transvaalers would be found more
enterprising and numerous than the Free State men. It was, therefore,
natural to expect that the main attack would come from the north along
the railroad, and from the east, where the approach from the Transvaal
boundary, which is there marked by the Buffalo River, is over a
country much more practicable than the western mountain range. These
considerations in {p.038} fact appear to have dictated the first
combination of the Boers.
Within a week from the opening of hostilities, the latter had occupied
Newcastle, thirty-seven miles by rail from Glencoe. On the 18th further
demonstrations caused General Symons to withdraw the outpost
stationed at Glencoe to the camp, which was a mile and a half west of
Dundee. The following day, Thursday, he received information, which
proved to be in the main accurate, that a combined movement was in
progress by which his position was to be simultaneously attacked from
the north and from the east. The force in the latter direction was given
at 7,000--probably an excessive estimate; although, as several
commandos had been reported on Wednesday to be moving from the
northern toward the eastern column, it is probable that the latter was
expected to make the chief attack. A British reconnaissance on the
same evening had showed the enemy apparently in force some ten
miles to the northward on the railway; but, if an attack from that quarter

were intended, the Boer combination failed, for none was made.
General {p.039} Joubert, in reporting the results, said, "Commandant
Lucas Meyer (commanding the eastern force) has had an engagement
with the British at Dundee. Meyer made a plan of campaign by
messenger with Commandant Erasmus, who, however, did not put in
an appearance." Convergent attacks, intended to be simultaneous, but
starting from different quarters, are particularly liable to such mishaps.
While these two columns on the 18th were moving on Dundee, a third
force of