Phaethon | Page 8

country: would not all
these mistakes be hurtful ones?"
"Certainly," said I: but Alcibiades was silent.
S. "And would not these mistakes, by the hypothesis, themselves
punish him who made them, without any resentment whatsoever, or
Nemesis of the Gods being required for his chastisement?"
"It seems so," said I.
S. "But can we say of such mistakes, and of the harm which may accrue
from them, anything but that they must both be infinite; seeing that
they are mistakes concerning an infinite Being, and his infinite
properties, on every one of which, and on all together, our daily
existence depends?"
P. "It seems so."
S. "So that, until such a man's error concerning Zeus, the source of all
things, is cleared up, either in this life or in some future one, we cannot
but fear for him infinite confusion, misery, and harm, in all matters
which he may take in hand?"
Then Alcibiades, angrily: "What ugly mask is this you have put on,
Socrates? You speak rather like a priest trying to frighten rustics into
paying their first-fruits, than a philosopher inquiring after that which is
beautiful. But you shall never terrify me into believing that it is not a
noble thing to speak out whatsoever a man believes, and to go forward
boldly in the spirit of truth."
S. "Feeling first, I hope, with your staff, as would be but reasonable in
the case of the bridge, whether your belief was objectively or only
subjectively true, lest you should fall through your subjective bridge
into objective water. Nevertheless, leaving the bridge and the water, let
us examine a little what this said spirit of truth may be. How do you
define it?"

A. "I assert that whosoever says honestly what he believes, does so by
the spirit of truth."
S. "Then if Lyce, patting those soft cheeks of yours, were to say:
'Alcibiades, thou art the fairest youth in Athens,' she would speak by
the spirit of truth?"
A. "They say so."
S. "And they say rightly. But if Lyce, as is her custom, wished, by so
saying, to cheat you into believing that she loved you, and thereby to
wheedle you out of a new shawl, she would still speak by the spirit of
truth?"
A. "I suppose so."
S. "But if, again, she said the same thing to Phaethon, she would still
speak by the spirit of truth?"
"By no means, Socrates," said I, laughing.
S. "Be silent, fair boy; you are out of court as an interested party.
Alcibiades shall answer. If Lyce, being really mad with love, like
Sappho, were to believe Phaethon to be fairer than you, and say so, she
would still speak by the spirit of truth?"
A. "I suppose so."
S. "Do not frown; your beauty is in no question. Only she would then
be saying what is not true?"
"I must answer for him after all," said I.
S. "Then it seems, from what has been agreed, that it is indifferent to
the spirit of truth, whether it speak truth or not. The spirit seems to be
of an enviable serenity. But suppose again, that I believed that
Alcibiades had an ulcer on his leg, and were to proclaim the same now
to the people, when they come into the Pnyx, should I not be speaking
by the spirit of truth?"

A. "But that would be a shameful and blackguardly action."
S. "Be it so. It seems, therefore, that it is indifferent to the spirit of truth
whether that which it affirms be honourable or blackguardly. Is it not
so?"
A. "It seems so, most certainly, in that case at least."
S. "And in others, as I think. But tell me-Is not the man who does what
he believes, as much moved by this your spirit of truth as he who says
what he believes?"
A. "Certainly he is."
S. "Then if I believed it right to lie or steal, I, in lying or stealing,
should lie or steal by the spirit of truth?"
A. "Certainly: but that is impossible."
S. "My fine fellow, and wherefore? I have heard of a nation among the
Indians who hold it a sacred duty to murder every one not of their own
tribe, whom they can waylay: and when they are taken and punished by
the rulers of that country, die joyfully under the greatest torments,
believing themselves certain of an entrance into the Elysian fields, in
proportion to the number of murders which they have committed."
A. "They must be impious wretches."
S. "Be it so. But believing themselves to be right, they commit murder
by the spirit of truth."
A. "It seems to follow from the argument."
S. "Then it is indifferent to the spirit of truth whether the action which
it