Phaethon | Page 9

prompts be right or wrong?"
A. "It must be confessed."
S. "It is therefore not a moral faculty, this spirit of truth. Let us see now

whether it be an intellectual one. How are intellectual things defined,
Phaethon? Tell me, for you are cunning in such matters."
P. "Those things which have to do with processes of the mind."
S. "With right processes, or with wrong?"
P. "With right, of course."
S. "And processes for what purpose?"
P. "For the discovery of facts."
S. "Of facts as they are, or as they are not?"
P. "As they are."
S. "And he who discovers facts as they are, discovers truth; while he
who discovers facts as they are not, discovers falsehood?"
P. "He discovers nothing, Socrates."
S. "True; but it has been agreed already that the spirit of truth is
indifferent to the question whether facts be true or false, but only
concerns itself with the sincere affirmation of them, whatsoever they
may be. Much more then must it be indifferent to those processes by
which they are discovered."
P. "How so?"
S. "Because it only concerns itself with affirmation concerning facts;
but these processes are anterior to that affirmation."
P. "I comprehend."
S. "And much more is it indifferent to whether those are right processes
or not."
P. "Much more so."

S. "It is therefore not intellectual. It remains, therefore, that it must be
some merely physical faculty, like that of fearing, hungering, or
enjoying the sexual appetite."
A. "Absurd, Socrates!"
S. "That is the argument's concern, not ours: let us follow manfully
whithersoever it may lead us."
A. "Lead on, thou sophist!"
S. "It was agreed, then, that he who does what he thinks right, does so
by the spirit of truth-was it not?"
A. "It was."
S. "Then he who eats when he thinks that he ought to eat, does so by
the spirit of truth?"
A. "What next?"
S. "This next, that he who blows his nose when he thinks that it wants
blowing, blows his nose by the spirit of truth."
A. "What next?"
S. "Do not frown, friend. Believe me, in such days as these, I honour
even the man who is honest enough to blow his nose because he finds
that he ought to do so. But tell me-a horse, when he shies at a beggar,
does not he also do so by the spirit of truth? For he believes sincerely
the beggar to be something formidable, and honestly acts upon his
conviction."
"Not a doubt of it," said I, laughing, in spite of myself, at Alcibiades's
countenance.
S. "It is in danger, then, of proving to be something quite brutish and
doggish, this spirit of truth. I should not wonder, therefore, if we found
it proper to be restrained."

A. "How so, thou hair-splitter?"
S. "Have we not proved it to be common to man and animals; but are
not those passions which we have in common with animals to be
restrained?"
P. "Restrain the spirit of truth, Socrates?"
S. "If it be doggishly inclined. As, for instance, if a man knew that his
father had committed a shameful act, and were to publish it, he would
do so by the spirit of truth. Yet such an act would be blackguardly, and
to be restrained."
P. "Of course."
S. "But much more, if he accused his father only on his own private
suspicion, not having seen him commit the act; while many others, who
had watched his father's character more than he did, assured him that he
was mistaken."
P. "Such an act would be to be restrained, not merely as blackguardly,
but as impious."
S. "Or if a man believed things derogatory to the character of the Gods,
not having seen them do wrong himself, while all those who had given
themselves to the study of divine things assured him that he was
mistaken, would he not be bound to restrain an inclination to speak
such things, even if he believed them?"
P. "Surely, Socrates; and that even if he believed that the Gods did not
exist at all. For there would be far more chance that he alone was
wrong, and the many right, than that the many were wrong, and he
alone right. He would therefore commit an insolent and conceited
action, and, moreover, a cruel and shameless one; for he would
certainly make miserable, if he were believed, the hearts of many
virtuous persons who had never harmed him, for no immediate or
demonstrable purpose except that of pleasing his own self-will; and that
much more, were he wrong in his assertion."

S. "Here, then, is another case in which it seems proper to restrain the
spirit of truth, whatsoever it may be?"
P. "What, then, are we to say of those who