Phaethon | Page 7

be a

coward, might not this also be hurtful to you? If, for instance, you
attacked him carelessly, expecting him to run away, and he defended
himself valiantly, and conquered you; or if you neglected to call for his
help in need, expecting him falsely, as in the former case, to run away;
would not such a mistake be hurtful to you, and punish you, not by any
anger of the man against you, but by your mistake itself?"
A. "It is evident."
S. "We may assume, then, that such mistakes at least are hurtful, and
that they are liable to be punished by the very laws of that concerning
which we mistake?"
A. "We may so assume."
S. "Suppose, then, we were to say: 'What argument is this of yours,
Protagoras?-that concerning lesser things, both intellectual and moral,
such as concerning number, music, or the character of a man, mistakes
are hurtful, and liable to bring punishment, in proportion to our need of
using those things: but concerning the Gods, the very authors and
lawgivers of number, music, human character, and all other things
whatsoever, mistakes are of no consequence, nor in any way hurtful to
man, who stands in need of their help, not only in stress of battle, once
or twice in his life, as he might of the brave man, but always and in all
things both outward and inward? Does it not seem strange to you, for it
does to me, that to make mistakes concerning such beings should not
bring an altogether infinite and daily punishment, not by any
resentment of theirs, but, as in the case of music or numbers, by the
very fact of our having mistaken the laws of their being, on which the
whole universe depends?'-What do you suppose Protagoras would be
able to answer, if he faced the question boldly?"
A. "I cannot tell."
S. "Nor I either. Yet one thing more it may be worth our while to
examine. If one should mistake concerning God, will his error be one
of excess, or defect?"

A. "How can I tell?"
S. "Let us see. Is not Zeus more perfect than all other beings?"
A. "Certainly, if it be true that, as they say, the perfection of each kind
of being is derived from him; he must therefore be himself more perfect
than any one of those perfections."
S. "Well argued. Therefore, if he conceived of himself, his conception
of himself would be more perfect than that of any man concerning
him?"
A. "Assuredly; if he have that faculty, he must needs have it in
perfection."
S. "Suppose, then, that he conceived of one of his own properties, such
as his justice; how large would that perfect conception of his be?"
A. "But how can I tell, Socrates?"
S. "My good friend, would it not be exactly commensurate with that
justice of his?"
A. "How then?"
S. "Wherein consists the perfection of any conception, save in this, that
it be the exact copy of that whereof it is conceived, and neither greater
nor less?"
A. "I see now."
S. "Without the Pythia's help, I should say. But, tell me-We agree that
Zeus's conception of his own justice will be exactly commensurate with
his justice?"
A. "We do."
S. "But man's conception thereof, it has been agreed, would be
certainly less perfect than Zeus's?"

A. "It would."
S. "Man, then, it seems, would always conceive God to be less just than
God conceives himself to be?"
A. "He would."
S. "And therefore to be less just, according to the argument, than he
really is?"
A. "True."
S. "And therefore his error concerning Zeus, would be in this case an
error of defect?"
A. "It would."
S. "And so on of each of his other properties?"
A. "The same argument would likewise, as far as I can see, apply to
them."
S. "So that, on the whole, man, by the unassisted power of his own
faculty, will always conceive Zeus to be less just, wise, good, and
beautiful than he is?"
A. "It seems probable."
S. "But does not that seem to you hurtful?"
A. "Why so?"
S. "As if, for instance, a man believing that Zeus loves him less than he
really does, should become superstitious and self- tormenting. Or,
believing that Zeus will guide him less than he really will, he should go
his own way through life without looking for that guidance: or if,
believing that Zeus cares about his conquering his passions less than he
really does, he should become careless and despairing in the struggle:
or if, believing that Zeus is less interested in the welfare of mankind

than he really is, he should himself neglect to assist them, and so lose
the glory of being called a benefactor of his