Phaethon | Page 6

A. "Of course I do."
S. "But not, I presume, between objective truth and subjective truth,
whereof Protagoras spoke?"
A. "What trap are you laying now? I distinguish between them also, of

course."
S. "Tell me, then, dear youth, of your indulgence, what they are; for I
am shamefully ignorant on the matter."
A. "Why, do they not call a thing objectively true, when it is true
absolutely in itself; but subjectively true, when it is true in the belief of
a particular person?"
S. "-Though not necessarily true objectively, that is, absolutely and in
itself?"
A. "No."
S. "But possibly true so?"
A. "Of course."
S. "Now, tell me-a thing is objectively true, is it not, when it is a fact as
it is?"
A. "Yes."
S. "And when it is a fact as it is not, it is objectively false; for such a
fact would not be true absolutely, and in itself, would it?"
A. "Of course not."
S. "Such a fact would be, therefore, no fact, and nothing."
A. "Why so?"
S. "Because, if a thing exists, it can only exist as it is, not as it is not; at
least my opinion inclines that way."
"Certainly not," said I; "why do you haggle so, Alcibiades?"
S. "Fair and softly, Phaethon! How do you know that he is not fighting
for wife and child, and the altars of his gods? But if he will agree with

you and me, he will confess that a thing which is objectively false does
not exist at all, and is nothing."
A. "I suppose it is necessary to do so. But I know whither you are
struggling."
S. "To this, dear youth, that, therefore, if a thing subjectively true be
also objectively false, it does not exist, and is nothing."
"It is so," said I.
S. "Let us, then, let nothing go its own way, while we go on ours with
that which is only objectively true, lest coming to a river over which it
is subjectively true to us that there is a bridge, and trying to walk over
that work of our own mind, but no one's hands, the bridge prove to be
objectively false, and we, walking over the bank into the water, be set
free from that which is subjectively on the farther bank of Styx."
Then I, laughing: "This hardly coincides, Alcibiades, with Protagoras's
opinion, that subjective truth was alone useful."
"But rather proves," said Socrates, "that undiluted draughts of it are of a
hurtful and poisonous nature, and require to be tempered with
somewhat of objective truth, before it is safe to use them-at least in the
case of bridges."
"Did I not tell you," interrupted Alcibiades, "how the old deceiver
would try to put me to bed of some dead puppy or log? Or do you not
see how, in order, after his custom, to raise a laugh about the whole
question by vulgar examples, he is blinking what he knows as well as
I?"
S. "What then, fair youth?"
A. "That Protagoras was not speaking about bridges, or any other
merely physical things, on which no difference of opinion need occur,
because every one can satisfy himself by simply using his senses; but
concerning moral and intellectual matters, which are not cognisable by

the senses, and therefore permit, without blame, a greater diversity of
opinion. Error on such points, he told us-on the subject of religion, for
example-was both pardonable and harmless; for no blame could be
imputed to the man who acted faithfully up to his own belief,
whatsoever that might be."
S. "Bravely spoken of him, and worthily of a free state. But tell me,
Alcibiades, with what matters does religion deal?"
A. "With the Gods."
S. "Then it is not hurtful to speak false things of the Gods?"
A. "Not unless you know them to be false."
S. "But answer me this, Alcibiades. If you made a mistake concerning
numbers, as that twice two made five, might it not be hurtful to you?"
A. "Certainly; for I might pay away five obols instead of four."
S. "And so be punished, not by any anger of two and two against you,
but by those very necessary laws of number, which you had mistaken?"
A. "Yes."
S. "Or if you made a mistake concerning music, as that two consecutive
notes could produce harmony, that opinion also, if you acted upon it,
would be hurtful to you?"
A. "Certainly; for I should make a discord, and pain my own ears, and
my hearers'."
S. "And in this case also, be punished, not by any anger of the lyre
against you, but by those very necessary laws of music which you had
mistaken?"
A. "Yes."
S. "Or if you mistook concerning a brave man, believing him to