On the Improvement of the Understanding | Page 8

so necessary complex
instruments, and for the progress of investigation. I thus proceed with
my demonstration.
[33] (1) A true idea, [m], (for we possess a true idea) is something
different from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different from the
idea of a circle. (2) The idea of a circle is not something having a
circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body
that body itself. (3) Now, as it is something different from its correlate,
it is capable of being understood through itself; in other words, the idea,
in so far as its actual essence (essentia formalis) is concerned, may be
the subject of another subjective essence (essentia objectiva). [33note1]
(4) And, again, this second subjective essence will, regarded in itself,
be something real, capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely.
[34] (1) For instance, the man Peter is something real; the true idea of
Peter is the reality of Peter represented subjectively, and is in itself
something real, and quite distinct from the actual Peter. (2) Now, as
this true idea of Peter is in itself something real, and has its own

individual existence, it will also be capable of being understood - that is,
of being the subject of another idea, which will contain by
representation (objective) all that the idea of Peter contains actually
(formaliter). (3) And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter has its own
individuality, which may become the subject of yet another idea; and so
on, indefinitely. (4) This everyone may make trial of for himself, by
reflecting that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows,
and further knows that he knows that he knows, &c. (34:5) Hence it is
plain that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary
first to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of
Peter. (6) This is the same as saying that, in order to know, there is no
need to know that we know, much less to know that we know that we
know. (7) This is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle
before knowing the nature of a triangle. [n]. (8) But, with these ideas,
the contrary is the case: for, in order to know that I know, I must first
know.
[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the
subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in which we
perceive an actual reality is certainty. (2) Further, it is also evident that,
for the certitude of truth, no further sign is necessary beyond the
possession of a true idea: for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to
know that we know that we know. (3) Hence, again, it is clear that no
one can know the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an
adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing: certainty is identical
with such subjective essence.
[36] (1) Thus, as the truth needs no sign - it being to possess the
subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them, in
order that all doubts may be removed - it follows that the true method
does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of
the idea, but that the true method teaches us the order in which we
should seek for truth itself, [o] or the subjective essences of things, or
ideas, for all these expressions are synonymous.
[37] (1) Again, method must necessarily be concerned with reasoning
or understanding - I mean, method is not identical with reasoning in the

search for causes, still less is it the comprehension of the causes of
things: it is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from
other perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that we may
so train our mind that it may, by a given standard, comprehend
whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down certain rules as aids, and by
avoiding useless mental exertion.
[38] (1) Whence we may gather that method is nothing else than
reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that as there can be no
idea of an idea - unless an idea exists previously, - there can be no
method without a pre-existent idea. (2) Therefore, that will be a good
method which shows us how the mind should be directed, according to
the standard of the given true idea. (38:3) Again, seeing that the ratio
existing between two ideas the same as the ratio between the actual
realities corresponding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective
knowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is more
excellent than