On the Improvement of the Understanding | Page 7

or, if they do see it, they see it
not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively, without going
through any process.
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may be
selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.
I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general. II. To
collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the oppositions
of things. III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be
modified. IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man
is capable of attaining.
[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of perception
we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is evident that from
hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain, and, moreover, can
give us no insight into the essence of a thing, as is manifest in our

illustration; now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through
knowledge of its essence, as will hereafter appear. (3) We may,
therefore clearly conclude that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot
be scientific in its character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect
anyone whose understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.
[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to give us the
idea of the proportion of which we are in search. (2) Moreover its
results are very uncertain and indefinite, for we shall never discover
anything in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental
properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the essence of
the things in question be known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also
must be rejected.
[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner that it
gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it us to draw conclusions
without risk of error; yet it is not by itself sufficient to put us in
possession of the perfection we aim at.
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of a
thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be the one
which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail ourselves of
it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay
concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will proceed to explain.
[30] (1) Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us,
we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the
said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known. (2) In order
to accomplish this, we must first take care not to commit ourselves to a
search, going back to infinity - that is, in order to discover the best
method of finding truth, there is no need of another method to discover
such method; nor of a third method for discovering the second, and so
on to infinity. (3) By such proceedings, we should never arrive at the
knowledge of the truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. (30:4) The
matter stands on the same footing as the making of material tools,
which might be argued about in a similar way. (5) For, in order to work
iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming
unless it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need of

another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. (6) We might
thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working iron.
[31] (1) But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied by
nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and
imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other things
more difficult with less labour and greater perfection; and so gradually
mounted from the simplest operations to the making of tools, and from
the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, and fresh
feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, complicated
mechanisms which they now possess. (31:2) So, in like manner, the
intellect, by its native strength, [k], makes for itself intellectual
instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other
intellectual operations, [l], and from these operations again fresh
instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations further, and thus
gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom.
[32] (1) That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be
readily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for finding
out the truth, and of the natural instruments