On the Improvement of the Understanding | Page 9

reflective knowledge concerning other objects - in other
words, that method will be most perfect which affords the standard of
the given idea of the most perfect being whereby we may direct our
mind.
[39] (1) We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it acquires
new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh instruments for
pursuing its inquiries further. (2) For we may gather from what has
been said, that a true idea must necessarily first of all exist in us as a
natural instrument; and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind,
it enables us to understand the difference existing between itself and all
other perceptions. (3) In this, one part of the method consists. (39:4)
Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it
understands a greater number of natural objects; it follows, therefore,
that this portion of the method will be more perfect in proportion as the
mind attains to the comprehension of a greater number of objects, and
that it will be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of
the absolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof.
[40] (1) Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does it
understand its own strength and the order of nature; by increased

self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and lay down rules for
its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge of nature, it can more
easily avoid what is useless. (2) And this is the sum total of method, as
we have already stated.
[41] (1) We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in the same
case as its correlate in the world of reality. (2) If, therefore, there be
anything in nature which is without connection with any other thing,
and if we assign to it a subjective essence, which would in every way
correspond to the objective reality, the subjective essence would have
no connection, [p] with any other ideas - in other words, we could not
draw any conclusions with regard to it. (41:3) On the other hand, those
things which are connected with others - as all things that exist in
nature - will be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences
will maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities - that
is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which will in turn
be connected with others, and thus our instruments for proceeding with
our investigation will increase. (4) This is what we were endeavoring to
prove.
[42] (1) Further, from what has just been said - namely, that an idea
must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the world of reality, -
it is evident that, in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful
image of nature, our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which
represents the origin and source of the whole of nature, so that it may
itself become the source of other ideas.
[43] (1) It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having said
that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our mind
according to the standard of the given true idea, we should prove our
point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it is not
self-evident. (2) We may, therefore, be questioned as to the validity of
our reasoning. (3) If our reasoning be sound, we must take as a
starting-point a true idea. (4) Now, to be certain that our starting-point
is really a true idea, we need proof. (5) This first course of reasoning
must be supported by a second, the second by a third, and so on to
infinity.

[44] (1) To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone
had adopted this method in his investigations of nature - that is, if he
had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the standard of
the original true idea, he would never have doubted [q] of the truth of
his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown, makes itself
manifest, and all things would flow, as it were, spontaneously towards
him. (44:2) But as this never, or rarely, happens, I have been forced so
to arrange my proceedings, that we may acquire by reflection and
forethought what we cannot acquire by chance, and that it may at the
same time appear that, for proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we
need no other means than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for
by valid reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like
measure, I seek still to establish it.
[45] (1) Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men in their
inward meditations. (2) The reasons for its rare employment in
investigations of