Lessons of the War | Page 3

the frontier makes it likely that the first
engagements will take place on this border. On the other side of the
theatre of war the Boers may be expected to invade Natal and to attack
Sir George White, whose forces a few days ago were divided between
positions near Ladysmith and Glencoe, places nearly thirty-five miles
apart. The bulk of the Boer forces are deployed on two sides of the

angle formed by the Natal border, where it meets the frontiers of the
Transvaal and of the Free State. From the Free State border Ladysmith
is about twenty-five miles distant in a straight line, and from the
Transvaal border near Vryheid to Ladysmith is about twice that
distance. If the Boers move on Thursday morning they would be able
easily to collect their whole force at Ladysmith on Sunday morning,
supposing the country contained no British troops. By Sunday,
therefore, the Boer commander, if he knows his business, ought to be
able to attack Sir George White with a force outnumbering the British
by something like two to one.
If I were a Cabinet Minister I should not sleep for the next few days,
but as an irresponsible citizen I trust that the Boers will be shocked to
find how much better the British soldier shoots in 1899 than he did in
1881.

THE MILITARY ISSUES
_October 18th_, 1899
When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousand
British troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for six
weeks the British forces in the theatre of war could not be substantially
increased. As they were of opinion that no settlement of the dispute
satisfactory to England could possibly be satisfactory to themselves
they had resolved upon fighting. If we assume, as we are bound to do,
that they had really faced the situation and thought it out, they must
have had in their minds some course of action by which if they should
begin the war on October 11th they would be likely to gain their end:
the recognition of the sovereignty of the Transvaal. They could hardly
expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate peace, but they might
hope to make the occupation of their country so difficult that Great
Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment of success. The
Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more than to gain
time, during which some outside embarrassment might cripple Great
Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Power might
interfere.
If before the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller and his men the Boers could
destroy a considerable fraction of the British forces now in South
Africa, their chance of prolonging the struggle would be greatly

improved. These forces were in two groups. There was the small army
of Sir George White in Natal, something more than fifteen thousand
men, and there were the detached parties holding points on the colonial
railway system, Naauwport, De Aar, Orange River, Kimberley and
Mafeking. These detachments, however, are largely made up of local
levies, and the total number of British troops among them can hardly
amount to three thousand. The whole set might be captured or
otherwise swept from the board without any material improvement in
the Boer position. Sir Redvers Buller is not tied to the line of railway
which most of the detachments guard, and the disappearance both of
the railway and of its protectors would be merely a temporary
inconvenience to the British. But if during the six weeks' respite it were
possible to destroy Sir George White's force the position would be very
substantially changed. The confidence of the Boers would be so
increased as to add greatly to their fighting power, the difficulties of Sir
Redvers Buller would be multiplied, the probability of outside
intervention might be brought nearer, and the Army of invasion to be
eventually resisted would be weaker by something like a quarter. For
these reasons I think Sir George White's force the centre of gravity of
the situation. If the Boers cannot defeat it their case is hopeless; if they
can crush it they may have hopes of ultimate success. That was the
bird's-eye view of the whole situation a week ago, and it still holds
good. The week's news does not enable us to judge whether the Boers
have grasped it. You can never be too strong at the decisive point, and a
first-rate general never lets a single man go away from his main force
except for a necessary object important enough to be worth the risk of a
great failure. The capture of Mafeking, of Kimberley, and even of Mr.
Cecil Rhodes, would not compensate the Boers for failure in Natal.
Neither Colonel Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewich