Lessons of the War | Page 4

would be likely
to make a serious inroad into Boer territory. I should therefore have
expected the Boers merely to watch these places with parties hardly
larger than patrols and to have thrown all their energy into a determined
attack on Sir George White. But they seem to have sent considerable
bodies, in each case several thousand men, against both Mafeking and
Kimberley. This proves either that they have a superabundance of force
at their disposal or that they have failed to grip the situation and to
concentrate their minds, their will, and their troops upon the key of the

whole position. I believe the latter to be the true interpretation.
If the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisive blow,
its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as you can, for
in war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easy to judge
whether the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission. When
the ultimatum expired his forces were spread along the border line of
the Free State and the Transvaal, so that a forward movement would
concentrate them in the northern triangle of Natal. The advance has not
been resisted, and at the end of a week the Transvaal wing of the
combined army has reached a point a few miles north of Glencoe, while
the bulk of the Free State wing is still behind the passes. The movement
has not been rapid, but as the ground is difficult--marches through a
mountainous country and in bad weather always take incomparably
longer than is expected--the delay may be due not to lack of energy but
to the inevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time throws
no light on the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels rapidity
in the decisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying with
the Army, the country, and the weather.
Sir George White's object is not merely to make the time pass until Sir
Redvers Buller's forces come upon the scene. He has also to prevent the
Boers from gaining any great advantage, moral or material. Time could
be gained by a gradual retreat, but that would raise the courage of the
Boer party, and depress the spirits of the British. Accordingly Sir
George White may be expected to take the first opportunity of showing
the Boers that his men are fighters, but he will avoid an engagement
such as might commit a fraction of his force against the Boer main
body. The detachment which was a few days ago near Glencoe may be
expected, as the Boer advance continues, to act as a rear guard, of
which the business is to delay the enemy without running too great a
risk of being itself cut off, or as an advance guard, which is to be
reinforced so soon as the general drift of the Boer movements has been
made out. The next few days can hardly pass without an engagement in
this quarter of Natal, and the first serious engagement will throw a
flood of light upon the aims of both generals and upon the quality of
the troops of both sides. Meantime the incidents of last week, the wreck
of the armoured train, and the attacks which have probably been made
upon Mafeking and Kimberley, are of minor importance.

A very serious piece of news, if it should be confirmed, is that the
Basutos have begun to attack the Free State. The British authorities
have exerted themselves to the utmost to prevent this and to keep the
Kaffir population quiet. The mere fact of the existence all over South
Africa of a Kaffir population outnumbering Boers and British together
made it an imperative duty of both white races to come to a peaceful
settlement. This was as well known to the Boers as to the British, and
forms an essential factor in any judgment on the action which has
caused and precipitated the conflict.

A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN
_October 25th_, 1899
The Boer Commander-in-Chief has beyond doubt grasped the situation.
His total force seems to be larger than was usually expected and to
exceed my own rough estimate of thirty-five thousand men, the balance
to his advantage being due probably to the British efforts to keep the
Basutos from attacking the Free State. Thus the Boers have been able
to overrun their western and southern borders in force sufficient to
make a pretence of occupying a large extent of territory in which only
the important posts specially prepared by the British for defence
continue to hold out. Of these posts, however, Mafeking and Kimberley
are as yet the only ones that have been attacked or threatened.
For operations in the northern corner of Natal the Boer commander was
able to