Indian Frontier Policy | Page 4

and reached Candahar
without opposition in April. At the end of June it recommenced its
march northwards, and Ghuznee having been stormed and captured, our
troops without further fighting arrived at Cabul on April 6. Dost
Mahomed, deserted for the time by his people, fled northward over the
Hindoo Koosh, finding a temporary refuge in Bokhara, and Shah
Soojah reigned in his stead.
So far the great expedition had apparently accomplished its object, and
the success of the tripartite treaty between ourselves, the Sikhs, and the
new Ameer had been successfully carried out, almost entirely, however,
by ourselves as the pre-dominant partner.
The time therefore would seem to have arrived when, in fulfilment of
Lord Auckland's proclamation, the British army should be withdrawn
from Afghanistan. For the moment this appeared to be the case. But in
reality it was not so, and our position soon became dangerous, then
critical, and at last desperate. In the first place, the long line of
communication was liable at any time to be interrupted, as already
mentioned; then, again, the arrival of Shah Soojah had excited no
enthusiasm; and the very fact that we were foreigners in language,
religion and race, rendered our presence hateful to his subjects. In short,
the new Ameer was, and continued to be, a mere puppet, supported in
authority by British bayonets.
These conditions were apparent from the first day of his arrival, and
grew in intensity until the end. Shah Soojah himself soon discovered
that his authority over his people was almost nominal; and although he

chafed at our continued presence in the country, he also felt that the day
of our departure would be the last of his reign, and that our withdrawal
was under the circumstances impossible. But the situation was equally
complicated from our own point of view. If, as originally promised, the
British troops were withdrawn, the failure of the expedition would at
once become apparent by the anarchy which would ensue. On the other
hand, to retain an army in the far-distant mountains of Afghanistan
would not only be a breach of faith, but, while entailing enormous
expense, would deprive India of soldiers who might be required
elsewhere.
After lengthy consideration, it was decided to reduce the total of our
force in the country, while retaining a hold for the present on Cabul,
Ghuznee, and Candahar, together with the passes of the Kyber and
Bolam. In short, the British army was weakly scattered about in a
region of mountains, amongst a hostile people, and with its long lines
of communication insufficiently guarded. Both in a military and a
political point of view the position was a false and dangerous one.
General Sir John Keane, who was about to return to India, writing at
the time, said 'Mark my words, it will not be long before there is here
some signal catastrophe.' During the summer of 1840 there were
troubles both in the Kyber and Bolam passes. In the former the tribes,
incensed at not receiving sufficient subsidies, attacked the outposts and
plundered our stores; while in Beloochistan matters were so serious that
a British force was sent, and captured Khelat, the Khan being killed,
and part of his territory handed over to Shah Soojah. [Footnote: In the
life of Sir Robert Sandeman, recently published, it is stated that the
alleged treachery of Mehrab Khan, which cost him his life, was on
subsequent inquiry not confirmed.] Rumours from Central Asia also
added to our anxieties. Although the failure of the Russian attempt on
Khiva became known some months later, it excited apprehension at the
time amongst our political officers in Cabul. Sir Alexander Burnes,
during the winter of 1839, expressed opinions which were curiously
inconsistent with each other. 'I maintain,' he said, 'that man to be an
enemy to his country who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of
the Indus; 'while at the same moment he advocated the advance of our

troops over the Hindoo Koosh into Balkh, so as to be ready to meet the
Russians in the following May.
Sir William McNaghten, the chief political officer in Cabul, went still
further, and in April 1840 not only urged a march on Bokhara, but also
contemplated sending a Mission to Kokand, in order, as he said, 'to
frustrate the knavish tricks of the Russians in that quarter.'
Our position, however, at that time was sufficiently precarious without
adding to our anxieties by distant expeditions in Central Asia, even had
the Russians established themselves in the Principalities, which at that
time was not the case. Not only was Afghanistan itself seething with
treachery and intrigues from one end to the other, but the Sikhs in the
Punjaub, our nominal allies, had, since the death of Runjeet Singh,
become disloyal and out of hand. Beloochistan