Indian Frontier Policy | Page 5

was in tumult; the tribes
in the Kyber, ever ready for mischief, incessantly threatened our
communications; so that we were certainly in no condition to enter
upon further dangerous expeditions against distant imaginary foes.
Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Commander-in-Chief, strongly objected to any
advance. 'In truth,' he said, 'we are much weaker now than in 1838.'
During the latter months of 1840, and in 1841, matters became steadily
worse, and all Afghanistan seemed ripe for revolt. 'We are in a stew
here,' wrote Sir William McNaghten in September; 'it is reported that
the whole country on this side the Oxus is up in favour of Dost
Mahomed, who is certainly advancing in great strength.' Again, in a
letter to Lord Auckland, he said 'that affairs in this quarter have the
worst possible appearance'--and he quoted the opinion of Sir
Willoughby Cotton, that 'unless the Bengal troops are instantly
strengthened we cannot hold the country.'
At this critical period, however, Dost Mahomed was heavily defeated at
Bamian, on the Hindoo Koosh, voluntarily surrendering shortly
afterwards, and for the moment prospects looked brighter; but the
clouds soon gathered again, and the end was at hand.
The Governor-General of India had throughout the whole war wisely

and steadfastly resisted the proposed further operations in Central Asia;
and the Court of Directors in London wrote as follows: 'We pronounce
our decided opinion that, for many years to come, the restored
monarchy will have need of a British force in order to maintain peace
in its own territory, and prevent aggression from without.' And they go
on: 'We again desire you seriously to consider which of the two
alternatives (a speedy retreat from Afghanistan, or a considerable
increase of the military force in that country) you may feel it your duty
to adopt. We are convinced that you have no middle course to pursue
with safety and with, honour.' The Government of India, hesitating to
the last, failed in adopting either of the alternatives.
In November, 1841, Sir Alexander Burnes was treacherously murdered
by a mob in Cabul, which was followed by an insurrection, and the
defeat of our troops. General Elphinstone, who was in command,
writing to Sir W. McNaghten on November 24, said that 'from the want
of provisions and forage, the reduced state of our troops, the large
number of wounded and sick, the difficulty of defending the extensive
and ill-situated cantonment we occupy, the near approach of winter, our
communications cut off, no prospect of relief, and the whole country in
arms against us, I am of opinion that it is not feasible any longer to
maintain our position in this country, and that you ought to avail
yourself of the offer to negotiate that has been made to you.'
This was conclusive. Our Envoy early in December met the Afghan
chiefs, and agreed that we should immediately evacuate the country,
and that Dost Mahomed, who was in exile in India, should return. On
December 23, Sir William McNaghten was treacherously murdered at a
conference with the Afghan Sirdars, within sight of the British
cantonment, and then came the end.
The British force at Cabul, leaving its guns, stores and treasure behind,
commenced its retreat on January 6, 1842; but incessantly attacked
during its march, and almost annihilated in the Koord Cabul Pass, it
ceased to exist as an organised body. General Elphinstone and other
officers, invited to a conference by Akbar Khan, were forcibly detained
as hostages, and on January 13 a solitary Englishman (Dr. Brydon)

arrived at Jellalabad, being, with the exception of a few prisoners, the
sole remaining representative of the force.
I have given this short sketch of the first Afghan war because,
disastrous as it was, the causes of our failure were due throughout far
more to rash and mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the
British troops engaged. Kaye in his 'History' gives a clear summary of
its original object and unfortunate results: 'The expedition across the
Indus was undertaken with the object of creating in Afghanistan a
barrier against encroachment from the west.' 'The advance of the
British army was designed to check the aggression of Persia on the
Afghan frontier, and to baffle Russian intrigues by the substitution of a
friendly for an unfriendly Power in the countries beyond the Indus.
After an enormous waste of blood and treasure, we left every town and
village of Afghanistan bristling with our enemies. Before the British
army crossed the Indus the English name had been honoured in
Afghanistan. Some dim traditions of the splendour of Mr. Elphinstone's
Mission had been all that the Afghans associated with their thoughts of
the English nation, but in their place we left galling memories of the
progress of a desolating army.'
The history of the war from first to last