Indian Frontier Policy | Page 3

Barsuk Desert,
north of the Aral.
In view of all the circumstances--of the supposed designs of Russia and
Persia, and of the hostility and incessant intrigues in Afghanistan--the
Government of India were sorely perplexed, and opinions amongst the
authorities widely differed as to the policy to be pursued. Lord
Auckland, however, at length decided on the assemblage of a British
force for service across the Indus. In his manifesto issued in December
1838 he first alluded to the Burnes mission, and the causes of its failure.
He then referred to the claims of Shah Soojah, a former ruler of
Afghanistan (who had been living for some years in exile within our
territories) and said we had determined, in co-operation with the Sikhs,
to restore him to power as Ameer of Cabul.
It was arranged that Shah Soojah should enter Afghanistan with his
own troops, such as they were, supported by a British army marching
through Scinde and Beloochistan. The Governor-General expressed a
hope that tranquillity would thus be established on the frontier, and a
barrier formed against external aggression; and he ended by pro
claiming that when the object was accomplished the British army
would be withdrawn.
This was indeed a momentous decision. The Commander-in-Chief in
India, Sir Henry Fane, had already given an adverse opinion, saying
that 'every advance you make beyond the Sutlej in my opinion adds to
your military weakness.'
On the decision becoming known in England many high authorities,
and the public generally, disapproved, of the expedition. The Duke of
Wellington said that 'our difficulties would commence where our
military successes ended,' and that 'the consequences of crossing the
Indus once, to settle a Government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial
march, into that country.' The Marquis Wellesley spoke of 'the folly of

occupying a land of rocks, sands, deserts, and snow.' Sir Charles
Metcalfe from the first protested, and said, 'Depend upon it, the surest
way to bring Russia down upon ourselves is for us to cross the Indus
and meddle with the countries beyond it.' Mr. Elphinstone wrote: 'If
you send 27,000 men up the Bolam to Candahar, and can feed them, I
have no doubt you can take Candahar and Cabul and set up Soojah, but
as for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote country,
among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be
hopeless. If you succeed you will I fear weaken the position against
Russia. The Afghans are neutral, and would have received your aid
against invaders with gratitude. They will now be disaffected, and glad
to join any invader to drive you out.'
Mr. Tucker, of the Court of Directors, wrote to the Duke of Wellington:
'We have contracted an alliance with Shah Soojah, although he does not
possess a rood of ground in Afghanistan, nor a rupee which he did not
derive from our bounty as a quondam pensioner.' He added, that 'even
if we succeed we must maintain him in the government by a large
military force, 800 miles from our frontier and our resources.'
The above were strong and weighty opinions and arguments against the
rash and distant enterprise on which the Government of India were
about to embark. But there is more to be said. Independently of the
result in Afghanistan itself, it must be borne in mind that the proposed
line of march of the army necessarily led through Scinde and
Beloochistan, countries which (whatever their former position may
have been) were then independent both of the Ameer and of ourselves.
The force from Bengal, consisting of about 9,500 men of all arms, with
38,000 camp followers, accompanied by Shah Soojah's levy, left
Ferozepore in December, and crossing the Indus, arrived at Dadur, the
entrance to the Bolam Pass, in March 1839. Difficulties with the
Ameers of Scinde at once arose, chiefly as to our passage through their
territories; but their remonstrances were disregarded, and they were
informed that 'the day they connected themselves with any other Power
than England would be the last of their independence, if not of their
rule.' [Footnote: Kaye's War in Afghanistan.]

The army then advanced through the Bolam, and reached Quetta on
March 26th. But here again obstacles similar in character to those just
described occurred, and Sir Alexander Burnes visited the ruler of
Beloochistan (the Khan of Khelat), demanding assistance, especially as
to supplies of food. The Prince, with prophetic truth, pointed out that
though we might restore Shah Soojah, we would not carry the Afghans
with us, and would fail in the end. He alluded to the devastation which
our march had already caused in the country; but having been granted a
subsidy, unwillingly consented to afford us assistance; and the army,
leaving possible enemies in its rear, passed on,