In the World War | Page 8

of 1866 and 1870, and struck when he held
good cards in his hand. The Germany of William II. had no desire for
war, but one day plunged headlong into it, and during the first week

had already created political situations which were beyond her power to
cope with. Belgium and Luxembourg were treated on the Bismarckian
principle of "Might before Right," and the world rose against Germany.
I say world, because England's power extended over the world.
At the beginning of the war England stood at "order arms." It would
have been entirely true to her traditional policy to allow Germany to
fight against France and Russia and mutually weaken each other, then
at a given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England was forced
to join in by Germany threatening to establish herself in Belgium. How
far the German invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing
to a French purpose to do likewise has still not been made clear--but
this argument does not apply to Luxembourg, and the breach of right
remains the same whether the country where it occurs be large or small.
The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg was a stroke of the
Bismarckian policy of violence, not carried out by politicians but by
generals who were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the
devastating consequences.
Later on, during the course of the war, the German Supreme Command
made repeated use of violent means, which were more detrimental than
useful to us, though subsequently these means were morally justifiable
and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on us, seeing that
Germany was fighting for her existence, and her adversaries, who
would not come to an understanding, left her no choice of means. The
use of noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns and the U-boat warfare
were means used in desperation against a merciless enemy, who left
women and children to die of starvation and declared day by day that
Germany must be annihilated.
When war was declared, that murderous element was lacking, and it
was only the entry into neutral territory that fostered an atmosphere of
such terrible hatred and vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war of
annihilation.
England's policy concerning Napoleon III. was more of a diplomatic
than a military nature, and everything tends to show that in the present

case England originally had no intention of joining in the conflagration,
but was content to see Germany weakened by her own confederates.
So far as I am in a position to review the situation no blame for the
wrongly estimated English attitude can be attached to our ambassadors
in London. Their predictions and warnings were correct, and the final
decision respecting the previously mentioned English ultimatum was
taken in Berlin and not in London. Moreover, the German Foreign
Office would never voluntarily have consented to the acts of violence,
but the military party, who cared neither for diplomatic reports nor
political complications, carried everything before them.
It will always be particularly difficult in a war to define the limits of
military and political spheres of action. The activities of both encroach
to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole, and very
naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs. Nevertheless,
the complete displacement of politicians into subordinate positions
which was effected in Germany and thereby made manifest the fact that
the German Supreme Military Command had possessed itself of all
State power of command, was a misfortune. Had the politicians at
Berlin obtained a hearing there would never have been any invasion of
Belgium, nor yet the ruthless U-boat warfare, the abstention from
which would in both cases have saved the life of the Central Powers.
From the very first day the Emperor William was as a prisoner in the
hands of his generals.
The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was, like so much else,
an heirloom from Bismarck, and the "Prussian lieutenant, inimitable
save in Germany," became her doom. The entire German people
believed in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the arms
of his generals and took upon himself a responsibility far surpassing the
normal limit of what was bearable. Thus the Emperor William allowed
his generals full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their tactics
seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne was a godsend
for the Entente in their direst need. But, later, when the war long since
had assumed a totally different character, when the troops were made
stationary by the war of position and fresh enemies were constantly

rising up against us, when Italy, Roumania, and finally America
appeared on the scene, then did the German generals achieve miracles
of strategy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff became gods in the eyes of the