In the World War | Page 7

publish a short communiqué relating
to the military measures taken for the safety of the country."
Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn
up as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for
war, as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870
Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a
different character.
In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a Note should have
been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who
hitherto were favourably disposed towards us.
Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and
confidentially furnished proofs to the Great Powers who were not
inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending

over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a
very different frame of mind in those Governments. Instead, we flung
the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe.
It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the
Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new
conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the
year 1914 the case was very different from former days--before the
ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side.
At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution, and
had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was the
attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We also
succeeded, but in an opposite sense.
4
Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium.
Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his
book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells
how on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the
English Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany
would respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were
already on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but,
returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in
before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into
Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his
passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused,
and the consequence was a declaration of war by England.
That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would
resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is fully in
accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English Ambassador.
Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave
France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian
neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action

against France. The contradiction between both points of view is
clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation is
that on August 4 England no longer adhered to her standpoint of
August 2, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the
evening of August 4 had wrested from England the moral possibility of
making further claims. If England, on August 4, had sought a pretext
for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also
that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do so,
and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying her
own hands in the event of Germany accepting the ultimatum. _On the
night of August 4, between the hours of nine and midnight, the decision
as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with Germany._
Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of the
certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom. That
was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the diplomats in this
war. The former were naturally the motive power.
The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a
furious onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne.
In more respects than one, German policy foundered on the heritage
left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a
lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually forcing
the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but Bismarck's
heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans, though
desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently
competent to lead them therein.
Bismarck created the German Empire out of Düppel, Königgrätz and
Sedan. His policy was one of "blood and iron"--and for fifty years that
policy of violence and violent means had been engrained in the mind of
every German schoolboy as the gospel of diplomatic art--but Bismarck
was not able to bequeath to the German people his genial efficiency,
wisdom and prudence in the use of his violent means. Bismarck
carefully prepared the wars