In the World War | Page 9

German people; the whole of Germany looked up to them and hoped
for victory through them alone. They were more powerful than the
Emperor, and he, therefore, less than ever in a position to oppose them.
Both the generals drew the wellnigh unlimited measure of their power
direct from the Entente, for the latter left the Germans in no doubt that
they must either conquer or die. The terrified and suffering people
clung, therefore, to those who, as they believed, alone could give them
victory.
5
Anglo-German competition, the increasing decadence of the Monarchy,
and the consequent growing lust of conquest evinced by our neighbours
had prepared the soil for war. Serbia, by the assassination, brought
about an acute state of tension, and Russia profited thereby to fling
herself on the Central Powers.
That appears to me to be briefly an objective history of the beginning
of the war. Faults, errors and omissions from the most varied sources
may occur in it, but can neither alter nor affect the real nature of the
case.
The victorious Entente gives a different interpretation of it. They
maintain that Germany let loose the war, and the terrible peace of
Versailles is the product of that conception, for it serves as punishment.
A neutral court of justice, as proposed by Germany, was refused. Their
own witnesses and their own judges suffice for them. They are judge
and prosecutor in one. In Dr. Bauer, the German-Austrian Secretary of
State, they have certainly secured an important witness for their view of
the case. In the winter of 1918 the latter openly declared that "three
Austro-Hungarian counts and one general had started the war."[1]
Were that true, then Germany would also have to bear a vast amount of

blame. For the four "guilty ones" could not have incited to war without
being sure of having Germany at their back, and were it true, there
could only have been a question of some plot laid by the
Austro-Hungarian and the German Governments, in which case
Germany, being the vastly superior military element, would
undoubtedly have assumed the rôle of leader.
Bauer's statement shows that they who inflicted the punitive peace were
right.
6
While the war was going on, a separate peace on our side that would
have delivered up Germany would have been treachery. But had
attempts at peace failed owing to the claims put forward by Germany,
we should have been morally justified in breaking away from them, as
we were united together in a war of defence and not in a war of
conquest. Although the German military party both dreamed and talked
incessantly of conquest, which doubtless gave rise to a
misunderstanding of the situation, that was by no means the exclusive
reason why peace could not be attained. It simply was because on no
consideration could the Entente be induced to pardon Germany. I have
already mentioned this in my speech of December 11, 1918,[2] in
which I discoursed on politics in the world war: "Ludendorff is exactly
like the statesmen of France and England. None of them wishes to
compromise, they only look for victory: in that respect there is no
difference between them." As long as I was in office the Entente would
never come to an agreement with Germany inter pares, thereby directly
forcing us to assume the part of a war of defence. Had we succeeded in
what we so often attempted to do, namely to make the Entente
pronounce the saving word; and had we ever been able to make the
Entente state that they were ready to conclude a status quo peace with
Germany, we would have been relieved of our moral obligations.
Against this may be quoted: "_Salus rei publicas supreme lex_"--in
order to save the Monarchy Germany would have to be given up, and
therefore the other question must be inquired into as to whether the
"physical possibility" of a separate peace really did exist. I also

mentioned this matter in the aforesaid speech, and expressly stated then,
and withdraw nothing, that after the entry of England, then of Italy,
Roumania, and finally of America into the war, I considered a victory
peace on our side to be a Utopian idea. But up to the last moment of my
official activities, I cherished the hope of a peace of understanding
from month to month, from week to week, even from day to day, and
believed that the possibility would arise of obtaining such a peace of
understanding, however great the sacrifices. Just as little as anyone else
could I foresee the end which practically has arrived, nor yet the
present state of affairs. A catastrophe of such magnitude and such
dimensions was never what I feared. This is confirmed in the published
report of my aforesaid speech,