In the World War | Page 6

moral and military power, but whether this would
prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff appears
to me doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was firmly
persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go
through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the
year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date. For this reason,
because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of either
Russia or France, and secondly because--and this is a very important
point--he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy into this war,
while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and peace-loving
Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany on any
other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he wished
to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of Austria-Hungary
in the deciding struggle. That, however, was his policy, and not
Bethmann's.
This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by lengthy
conversations with Count Tisza--an impression which has been
confirmed from other sources. I am persuaded, however, that Tschirsky,
in behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of
activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I conclude this to be
so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in a former dispatch, was never in a
position to make an official declaration urging for war, but appears
only to have spoken after the manner of diplomatic representatives
when anxious to adapt the policy of their Government to their own
point of view. Undoubtedly Tschirsky transmitted his instructions
correctly and loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete anything. An
ambassador attains more or less according to the energy expended by
him in carrying out the instructions of his Government; and the private
opinion of the ambassador is, under certain circumstances, not easy to
distinguish from his official one. At all events, the latter will be

influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's private opinion aimed at a
more vigorous policy.
In complete ignorance of impending events, I had arrived at Steiermark
a few days before the ultimatum in order to establish my family there
for the summer. While there I received a message from Berchtold to
return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at once, but before
leaving had one more audience with the Emperor Francis Joseph at
Ischl. I found the Emperor extremely depressed. He alluded quite
briefly to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case of a war, I
could guarantee Roumania's neutrality. I answered in the affirmative,
so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any guarantee was
impossible.
3
Certain extremely important details relating to the period immediately
preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence of
the group represented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we
granted to our then allies, Italy and Roumania, facilities for playing the
part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before action
was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them also.
I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in
Roumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield. In all
probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of
renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious
feeling would have arisen between Bucharest and Belgrade, which
would strongly have influenced further Roumanian policy in our
favour.
Bucharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic
proceedings.
Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian
Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared that
the situation in Roumania and Italy was similar, and in each case there
was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome nor Bucharest had

previously come to an understanding regarding the ultimatum. His
efforts were crowned with success.
On August 1, 1914, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold:
"The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet
Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty into
force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that no party
could undertake the responsibility of such action.
"The Cabinet Council has resolved that _as Roumania was neither
notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in
Belgrade no casus foederis exists_. The Cabinet Council further
resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier be
undertaken, which would be an advantage for the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its frontiers would thereby be
covered.
"The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to
strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general
mobilisation would follow.
"The Government intends only to