In the World War | Page 5

position was this:
that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the evening of the
same day on which the order for general mobilisation was to be

submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him whether a
postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible in view of
the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the different
parties prevailing in Russia, and no guarantee was obtainable that those
who were in favour of negotiation would gain the day. Any
postponement of mobilisation might in this case lead to incalculable
military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun without the
knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they were also to be
carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary would be too late.
I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material
placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire into
this side of the question and then leave the decision to the Emperor
Francis Joseph.
On the following day, July 31, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz,
communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince
Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows:--
"Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to concert
with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly desirous that such
an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My
Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to
suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be
satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian
territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other
countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations. Trust William
will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal,
thus proving that Germany and England are working together to
prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure
William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to
preserve peace of Europe.
GEORGE."
Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on July 31, subject to
certain military precautions, a proceeding that did not satisfy London.

In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine the conflict to
Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In Russia there was a strong party
working hard to enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was an
accomplished fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop
mobilisation at the last moment for fear of being too late with defence.
Some ambassadors did not keep to the instructions from their
Governments; they communicated messages correctly enough, but if
their personal opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it certainly
weighed in the balance.
This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berchtold vacillated, torn
hither and thither by different influences. It was a question of hours
merely; but they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster was
the result.
Russia had created strained conditions which brought on the world war.
Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all
these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen
Tisza. He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he
foresaw a war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most widely
spread errors to stigmatise Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the
war. He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but
because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance would
in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the Monarchy. He
particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which then was still
neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before we went to war.
I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning the activities of
the German Government as displayed by the German Ambassador
immediately preceding the war. I purposely made a distinction between
the German Government and the German diplomat, as I was under the
impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various steps without
being instructed so to do, and when I previously have alluded to the
fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the language enjoined by
their Governments, I had Herr von Tschirsky specially in my mind; his
whole temperament and feelings led him to interfere in our affairs with
a certain vehemence and not always in the most tactful way, thus

rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy.
There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky's private
speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of "Now or Never," and it
is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be "that
at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point of
view with all her