Human Nature and Other Sermons | Page 7

to their consequences to himself:
to assert that any common man would be affected in the same way
towards these different actions, that he would make no distinction
between them, but approve or disapprove them equally, is too glaring a
falsity to need being confuted. There is therefore this principle of
reflection or conscience in mankind. It is needless to compare the
respect it has to private good with the respect it has to public; since it
plainly tends as much to the latter as to the former, and is commonly
thought to tend chiefly to the latter. This faculty is now mentioned
merely as another part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in
some degree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally and
of course have some influence. The particular place assigned to it by
nature, what authority it has, and how great influence it ought to have,
shall be hereafter considered.
From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and
private affections, of the courses of life they lead to, and of the
principle of reflection or conscience as respecting each of them, it is as
manifest that WE WERE MADE FOR SOCIETY, AND TO
PROMOTE THE HAPPINESS OF IT, AS THAT WE WERE
INTENDED to TAKE CARE OF OUR OWN LIFE AND HEALTH
AND PRIVATE GOOD.
And from this whole review must be given a different draught of
human nature from what we are often presented with. Mankind are by
nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the
inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is as
much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as
much desired as any external goods; and in many particular cases
persons are carried on to do good to others, as the end their affection

tends to and rests in; and manifest that they find real satisfaction and
enjoyment in this course of behaviour. There is such a natural principle
of attraction in man towards man that having trod the same tract of land,
having breathed in the same climate, barely having been born in the
same artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of contracting
acquaintances and familiarities many years after; for anything may
serve the purpose. Thus relations merely nominal are sought and
invented, not by governors, but by the lowest of the people, which are
found sufficient to hold mankind together in little fraternities and
copartnerships: weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough for
ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the real principles of that
union: but they are in truth merely the occasions, as anything may be of
anything, upon which our nature carries us on according to its own
previous bent and bias; which occasions therefore would be nothing at
all were there not this prior disposition and bias of nature. Men are so
much one body that in a peculiar manner they feel for each other shame,
sudden danger, resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another,
or all of these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence,
upon the occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection,
dependence; each of these being distinct cements of society. And
therefore to have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our
behaviour, is the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as
single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has
respect to our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this
is the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no
natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.
But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions and
principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well as to do
good? Whence come the many miseries else which men are the authors
and instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far as they relate
to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by asking, Has not man
also dispositions and principles within which lead him to do evil to
himself, as well as good? Whence come the many miseries
else--sickness, pain, and death--which men are instruments and authors
of to themselves?

It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than the
other, but the answer to both is really the same: that mankind have
ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as well to the
injury of others as in contradiction to known private interest: but that as
there is no such thing as self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing
as ill-will in one man towards another, emulation and resentment being
away; whereas there is plainly benevolence or good-will: there is no