Human Nature and Other Sermons | Page 6

as to PRIVATE. It might be thought too
minute and particular, and would carry us too great a length, to
distinguish between and compare together the several passions or
appetites distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention is
the security and good of society, and the passions distinct from
self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and good
of the individual. {4} It is enough to the present argument that desire of
esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, love of society as
distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation against successful
vice--that these are public affections or passions, have an immediate
respect to others, naturally lead us to regulate our behaviour in such a
manner as will be of service to our fellow-creatures. If any or all of
these may be considered likewise as private affections, as tending to
private good, this does not hinder them from being public affections too,
or destroy the good influence of them upon society, and their tendency
to public good. It may be added that as persons without any conviction
from reason of the desirableness of life would yet of course preserve it
merely from the appetite of hunger, so, by acting merely from regard
(suppose) to reputation, without any consideration of the good of others,
men often contribute to public good. In both these instances they are
plainly instruments in the hands of another, in the hands of Providence,
to carry on ends--the preservation of the individual and good of
society--which they themselves have not in their view or intention. The
sum is, men have various appetites, passions, and particular affections,

quite distinct both from self- love and from benevolence: all of these
have a tendency to promote both public and private good, and may be
considered as respecting others and ourselves equally and in common;
but some of them seem most immediately to respect others, or tend to
public good; others of them most immediately to respect self, or tend to
private good: as the former are not benevolence, so the latter are not
self-love: neither sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or
others, but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the
individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be
instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so to
ourselves.
Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they
distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We are
plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own
nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its
propensions, aversions, passions, affections as respecting such objects,
and in such degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon.
In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a
third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This
principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart,
temper, and actions, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the
word, though sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this
faculty tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and
leads them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon.
Thus a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him to
take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the natural
affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is his proper business,
what belongs to him, that it is right and commendable so to do--this,
added to the affection, becomes a much more settled principle, and
carries him on through more labour and difficulties for the sake of his
children than he would undergo from that affection alone, if he thought
it, and the cause of action it led to, either indifferent or criminal. This
indeed is impossible, to do that which is good and not to approve of it;
for which reason they are frequently not considered as distinct, though
they really are: for men often approve of the action of others which
they will not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not. It

cannot possibly be denied that there is this principle of reflection or
conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an innocent
person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in the fury
of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given no just
cause of offence. To aggravate the injury, add the circumstances of
former friendship and obligation from the injured person; let the man
who is supposed to have done these two different actions coolly reflect
upon them afterwards, without regard