Human Nature and Other Sermons | Page 8

such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but
only eager desires after such and such external goods; which, according
to a very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to
obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to their
end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will consider
what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found nothing to
the purpose of this objection; and that the principles and passions in the
mind of man, which are distinct both from self- love and benevolence,
primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with regard to
others as well as himself, and only secondarily and accidentally to what
is evil. Thus, though men, to avoid the shame of one villainy, are
sometimes guilty of a greater, yet it is easy to see that the original
tendency of shame is to prevent the doing of shameful actions; and its
leading men to conceal such actions when done is only in consequence
of their being done; i.e., of the passion's not having answered its first
end.
If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in great measure
without the natural affections towards their fellow- creatures, there are
likewise instances of persons without the common natural affections to
themselves. But the nature of man is not to be judged of by either of
these, but by what appears in the common world, in the bulk of
mankind.
I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the truth of
this account of human nature, and make out the justness of the
foregoing comparison, it should be added that from what appears, men
in fact as much and as often contradict that PART of their nature which
respects SELF, and which leads them to their OWN PRIVATE good
and happiness, as they contradict that PART of it which respects

SOCIETY, and tends to PUBLIC good: that there are as few persons
who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which they might
attain in the present world, as who do the greatest good to others which
they might do; nay, that there are as few who can be said really and in
earnest to aim at one as at the other. Take a survey of mankind: the
world in general, the good and bad, almost without exception, equally
are agreed that were religion out of the case, the happiness of the
present life would consist in a manner wholly in riches, honours,
sensual gratifications; insomuch that one scarce hears a reflection made
upon prudence, life, conduct, but upon this supposition. Yet, on the
contrary, that persons in the greatest affluence of fortune are no happier
than such as have only a competency; that the cares and
disappointments of ambition for the most part far exceed the
satisfactions of it; as also the miserable intervals of intemperance and
excess, and the many untimely deaths occasioned by a dissolute course
of life: these things are all seen, acknowledged, by every one
acknowledged; but are thought no objections against, though they
expressly contradict, this universal principle--that the happiness of the
present life consists in one or other of them. Whence is all this
absurdity and contradiction? Is not the middle way obvious? Can
anything be more manifest than that the happiness of life consists in
these possessed and enjoyed only to a certain degree; that to pursue
them beyond this degree is always attended with more inconvenience
than advantage to a man's self, and often with extreme misery and
unhappiness? Whence, then, I say, is all this absurdity and
contradiction? Is it really the result of consideration in mankind, how
they may become most easy to themselves, most free from care, and
enjoy the chief happiness attainable in this world? Or is it not
manifestly owing either to this, that they have not cool and reasonable
concern enough for themselves to consider wherein their chief
happiness in the present life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that
they will not act conformably to what is the result of that
consideration--i.e., reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love,
is prevailed over by passions and appetite? So that from what appears
there is no ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man,
which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow- creatures,
are more generally or in a greater degree violated than those which

most directly lead us to promote our own private good and happiness.
The sum of the whole is plainly this: The nature of man considered in
his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world, is
adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for
himself in