Greece and the Allies | Page 8

expected to fight, the
conditions under which she would fight, and the compensations which
she would receive in the event of victory. As a last resort he proposed
to adjourn the discussion until the afternoon. But M. Venizelos
answered that there was no time to lose: the War would be over in three
weeks.[10] Whereupon {13} M. Streit resigned, and M. Venizelos
offered to the Entente Ministers the adhesion of Greece forthwith.
The terms in which this offer was couched have never been divulged;
but from the French Minister's descriptions of it as made "à titre
gracieux" and "sans conditions," [11] it seems to have been

unconditional and unqualified. On the other hand, M. Venizelos at a
later period explained that he had offered to place Greece at the
disposal of the Entente Powers, if Turkey went to war with them.[12]
And it is not improbable that the primary objective in his mind was
Turkey, who still refused to relinquish her claims to the islands
conquered by the Greeks in 1912, and had just strengthened her navy
with two German units, the Goeben and the Breslau. However that may
be, King Constantine seconded the offer, expressing himself quite
willing to join the Entente there and then with the whole of his army,
but stipulating, on the advice of the General Staff, that the Greek forces
should not be moved to any place where they could not, if need arose,
operate against Bulgaria.
The King of England telegraphed to the King of Greece, thanking him
for the proposal, which, he said, his Government would consider. The
French and Russian Governments expressed lively satisfaction, France,
however, adding: "For the moment we judge that Greece must use all
her efforts to make Turkey observe her promised neutrality, and to
avoid anything that might lead the Turkish Government to abandon its
neutrality." The British answer, when it came at last, was to the same
effect: England wished by all means to avoid a collision with Turkey
and advised that Greece also should avoid a collision. She only
suggested for the present an understanding between the Staffs with a
view to eventual action.
This suggestion was apparently a concession to Mr. Winston Churchill,
who just then had formed the opinion that Turkey would join the
Central Powers, and had arranged with Lord Kitchener that two officers
of the Admiralty should meet two officers of the War Office to work
out a plan for the seizure, by means of a Greek army, of the {14}
Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea
of Marmara.[13] But it no way affected the British Government's
policy. The utmost that England and France were prepared to do in
order to meet the offer of Greece, and that only if she were attacked,
was to prevent the Turkish fleet from coming out of the Dardanelles;
France also holding out some hope of financial assistance, but none of
war material on an adequate scale.[14]

Such a reception of his advances was not very flattering to M.
Venizelos--it made him look foolish in the eyes of those who had
pleaded against precipitancy; and he took the earliest opportunity to
vent his ill-humour. King Constantine, in a reply to the British
Admiralty drafted with Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, stated that he would
not fight Turkey unless attacked by her--a statement in strict
consonance with the wishes of the Entente Powers at the time. But M.
Venizelos objected. After his own declarations to the Entente Ministers,
and after the exchange of telegrams with the King of England, he told
his sovereign he did not consider this reply possible. Turkey was their
enemy, and was it wise for them to reject a chance of fighting her with
many and powerful allies, so that they might eventually have to fight
her single-handed?[15]
Thus M. Venizelos argued, in the face of express evidence that those
allies did not desire the immediate participation of Greece in a war
against Turkey--because, anxious above all things to establish close
contact with them, he wanted the offer to remain open: "a promise that,
should at any time the Powers consider us useful in a war against
Turkey . . . we would be at their disposal." [16] And he professed
himself unable to understand how a course which appeared so clear to
him could possibly be obscure to others. But he had a theory--a theory
which served him henceforward as a stock explanation of every
difference of opinion, and in which the political was skilfully mixed
{15} with the personal factor. According to this theory, when face to
face with M. Venizelos, the King seldom failed to be convinced; but as
soon as M. Venizelos withdrew, he changed his mind. This happened
not once, but many times.[17] We have