Greece and the Allies | Page 7

to mobilize his army, place himself by
the Kaiser's side and march hand in hand against the common
enemy--Slavism. He made this urgent appeal for the last time,
convinced that the King of Greece would respond to it. If not, all would
be over between the two countries--this being a slightly attenuated
version of another marginal note: "I will treat Greece as an enemy if
she does not adhere at once."
King Constantine's answer was tactful but final: His personal
sympathies and his political opinions, he said, were on the Kaiser's side.
But alas! that which the Kaiser asked him to do was completely out of
the question. Greece could not under any conceivable circumstances
side against the Entente: the Mediterranean was at the mercy of the
united French and British fleets, which could destroy the Greek marine,
both royal and mercantile, take the Greek islands, and wipe Greece off
the map. Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was the only policy

for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser's threat with a
counter-threat, none the less pointed for being veiled under the guise of
an "assurance not to touch his friends among my neighbours (i.e.
Bulgaria and Turkey) as long as they do not touch our local Balkan
interests." [8]
{11}
Germany did not immediately resign herself to this rebuff. The Kaiser's
Government thought King Constantine's attachment to neutrality
reasonable--for the present; but at the same time urged Greece to enter
as soon as possible into a secret understanding with Bulgaria and
Turkey for eventual action against Servia, describing the latter country
as the bear's skin of which it would be a good stroke of business for
Greece to secure a share. The German Minister at Athens, better
acquainted with Greek views and feelings, took a less naïve line. He
did not want Greece to attack her ally, but was content to advise that
she should free herself from the ties that bound her to Servia, and in the
event of Bulgarian aggression just leave her ally in the lurch. But, if he
went less far than his chief in one direction, he went farther in another,
threatening, should Greece move on Servia's behalf, to ask for his
passport. This threat, like all the others, failed to move the Athens
Government;[9] and, unable to gain Greece as an ally, Germany was
henceforth glad enough not to have her as an enemy.
So far all those responsible for the policy of Greece appeared to be
unanimous in the decision not to be drawn prematurely into the
European cataclysm, but to reserve her forces for the defence of the
Balkan equilibrium. Under this apparent unanimity, however, lay
divergent tendencies.
King Constantine, a practical soldier, estimated that the European War
would be of long duration and doubtful issue: in this battle of giants he
saw no profit for pygmies, but only perils. At the same time, he did not
forget that Greece had in Bulgaria and Turkey two embittered enemies
{12} who would most probably try to fish in the troubled waters. If
they did so, he was prepared to fight; but to fight with a definite
objective and on a definite military plan which took into account the

elements of time, place, and resources.
The King's standpoint was shared by most Greek statesmen and
soldiers of note: they all, in varying degrees, stood for neutrality, with
possible intervention on the side of the Entente at some favourable
moment. But it did not commend itself to his Premier. Caution was
foreign to M. Venizelos's ambitious and adventurous temperament.
Military considerations had little meaning for his civilian mind. Taking
the speedy victory of the Entente as a foregone conclusion, and imbued
with a sort of mystical faith in his own prophetic insight and star, he
looked upon the European War as an occasion for Imperialist
aggrandizement which he felt that Greece ought to grasp without an
instant's delay.
It was not long before the underlying divergence came to the surface.
In the morning of 18 August, at a full Cabinet Meeting, M. Streit
mentioned that the Russian Minister had privately referred to the
possibility of Greece sending 150,000 men to fight with Servia against
the Austrians on the Danube--far away from the Greek Army's natural
base in Macedonia. On hearing this M. Venizelos impulsively declared
that he was ready to place all the Greek forces at the disposal of the
Entente Powers in accordance with their invitation. M. Streit
remonstrated that there had been no "invitation," but at most a sounding
from one of the Entente Ministers, which Greece should meet with a
counter-sounding, in order to learn to what extent the suggestion was
serious. Further, he objected that, before Greece committed herself, it
was necessary to find out where she would be