Greece and the Allies | Page 9

here a question of psychology
which cannot be casually dismissed. M. Venizelos's persuasive powers
are notorious, and it is highly probable that King Constantine
underwent the fascination which this man had for others. But behind it
all, according to the Venizelist theory, lurked another element:
"What, I think, confuses things and begets in the mind of your Majesty
and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to those supported by me, is the
wish not to displease Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in
co-operation with Powers hostile to her." Although M. Streit had laid

down his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King, with the
result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference of opinions
between the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself was fast
developing into a divergence of courses between the Crown and the
Cabinet: such a state of things was obviously undesirable, and M.
Venizelos, "in order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony
between the Crown and its responsible advisers," offered his
resignation.[18]
M. Venizelos did not resign after all. But his letter marks an epoch
none the less. At first, as we have seen, the avowed policy of the
Premier, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the King was the
same. The difference which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired
to throw Greece into the War immediately, without conditions and
without any invitation from the Entente, while the King and M. Streit
were more circumspect. M. Venizelos chose to interpret their
circumspection as prompted by regard for Germany, and did not
hesitate to convey this view to Entente quarters. It was, perhaps, a
plausible insinuation, since the King had a German wife and M. Streit
was of German descent. But, as a matter of fact, at the moment when it
was made, King Constantine voluntarily presented to the British
Admiralty through Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the
Dardanelles which his Staff had {16} elaborated, and for a long time
afterwards continued to supply the British Government, through the
same channel, with information from his secret service.[19]

[1] See Art. 1 of the Military Convention. As this article originally
stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the "case
of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and Bulgaria."
It was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request, and not without
objections on the part of Greek military men, into a "case of war
between one of the allied States and a third Power breaking out under
the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco-Servian Treaty of Alliance."
But the only circumstances foreseen and provided for by that Treaty
relate to war with Bulgaria, and it is a question whether any other
interpretation would stand before a court of International Law, despite

the "third Power" phrase in the Military Convention. All the documents
are to be found in the White Book, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6.
[2] See Art. 5 of the Military Convention.
[3] White Book, Nos. 19, 20, 22.
[4] White Book, Nos. 11, 13, 14.
[5] White Book, No. 23.
[6] Streit to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna,
Rome, Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, Nish. (No. 23,800.)
[7] Ibid.
[8] Part of the correspondence is to be found in Die deutschen
Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter
Schuking; part in the White Book, Nos. 24 and 26. As much
acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last dispatch,
it is worth while noting the circumstances under which it was sent.
Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval Mission in Greece,
relates how the King brought the Kaiser's telegram and read it to him:
"He was indignant at the interference in his country's affairs. However,
to stop such telegrams coming in daily, he determined to send on this
occasion a sympathetic answer." (See The Times, 9 Dec., 1920.) The
communication, therefore, was no secret from the British Government.
Nor was it from M. Venizelos; for the King's dispatch is but a summary
of an identical declaration made by M. Venizelos's Government itself
to the German Government: Streit to Greek Legation, Berlin, 26 July/8
Aug., 1914. Though omitted from the White Book, this document may
now be read in the Balkan Review, Dec., 1920, pp. 381-3.
[9] White Book, Nos. 28, 29, 30.
[10] My authority for this glimpse behind the scenes is M. Streit
himself.

[11] Deville, pp. 119, 128.
[12] Orations, pp. 93-4.
[13] Dardanelles Commission. Supplement to First Report, par. 45.
[14] Gennadius, London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 21 Aug./3 Sept.; 23 Aug./5
Sept.; Romanos, Paris, 16/29 Aug., 1914.
[15] White Book, No. 31.
[16] See Orations, p. 103.
[17] Ibid, pp. 41-2, 98.
[18] White Book, No. 31.
[19] See the Admiral's statements in the Weekly Dispatch, 21 Nov., and
in