Fundamental Principals of the Metaphysic of Morals | Page 7

is brought out which is incomparably the
highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty.
To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent with one's
condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily
become a great temptation to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to
duty, all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness,
because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. But the
precept of happiness is often of such a sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations,
and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of satisfaction
of all of them which is called happiness. It is not then to be wondered at that a single
inclination, definite both as to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be
gratified, is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that a gouty patient, for
instance, can choose to enjoy what he likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according
to his calculation, on this occasion at least, be has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the
present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which is supposed to
be found in health. But even in this case, if the general desire for happiness did not
influence his will, and supposing that in his particular case health was not a necessary
element in this calculation, there yet remains in this, as in all other cases, this law, namely,
that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty, and by this
would his conduct first acquire true moral worth.
It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture
also in which we are commanded to love our neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an
affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we
are not impelled to it by any inclination- nay, are even repelled by a natural and
unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not pathological- a love which is
seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense- in principles of action and not of
tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.
The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not
from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is
determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action,
but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without
regard to any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we
may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will,
cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie,
if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie
anywhere but in the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained
by the action. For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a
posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined
by something, it that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an
action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from
it.
The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express thus
Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. I may have inclination for an
object as the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this

reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will. Similarly I cannot have respect for
inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if
another's, sometimes even love it; i.e., look on it as favourable to my own interest. It is
only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no means as an effect- what does
not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it
from its calculation- in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of
respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the
influence of inclination and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which
can determine the