Fundamental Principals of the Metaphysic of Morals | Page 6

our actions always takes the first place and constitutes
the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which
includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and
hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather

bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter.
I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty, although
they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are
done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those
actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination,
performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this
case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from
duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the action
accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. For example, it is
always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser;
and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but
keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are
thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so
acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out of
the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in
favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one
over another. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct
inclination, but merely with a selfish view.
On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone has also a
direct inclination to do so. But on this account the of anxious care which most men take
for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their
life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other band, if
adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the
unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected,
wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it- not from inclination or fear,
but from duty- then his maxim has a moral worth.
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so
sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they
find a pleasure in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of
others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this
kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth,
but is on a level with other inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is
happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and
consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem. For the
maxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from
inclination. Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of
his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that, while he still has the
power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is
absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead
insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty,
then first has his action its genuine moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little
sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by
temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because in respect
of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude and supposes, or
even requires, that others should have the same- and such a man would certainly not be
the meanest product of nature- but if nature had not specially framed him for a

philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from whence to give himself a
far higher worth than that of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is
just in this that the moral worth of the character