Fundamental Principals of the Metaphysic of Morals | Page 8

will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this
practical law, and consequently the maxim * that I should follow this law even to the
thwarting of all my inclinations.

* A maxim is the subjective principle of volition. The objective principle (i.e., that which
would also serve subjectively as a practical principle to all rational beings if reason had
full power over the faculty of desire) is the practical law.

Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, nor in any
principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all
these effects- agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the happiness
of others- could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would
have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the
supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we call
moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which
certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the
expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the person
who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result. *

* It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure
feeling, instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason.
But although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through influence, but is
self-wrought by a rational concept, and, therefore, is specifically distinct from all feelings
of the former kind, which may be referred either to inclination or fear, What I recognise
immediately as a law for me, I recognise with respect. This merely signifies the
consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the intervention of other
influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the
consciousness of this, is called respect, so that this is regarded as an effect of the law on
the subject, and not as the cause of it. Respect is properly the conception of a worth
which thwarts my self-love. Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as
an object of inclination nor of fear, although it has something analogous to both. The
object of respect is the law only, and that the law which we impose on ourselves and yet
recognise as necessary in itself. As a law, we are subjected too it without consulting
self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our will. In the former aspect it
has an analogy to fear, in the latter to inclination. Respect for a person is properly only
respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of which he gives us an example. Since we also look
on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a person of talents,
as it were, the example of a law (viz., to become like him in this by exercise), and this

constitutes our respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law.

But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even
without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be
called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every
impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the
universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a
principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general,
without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as
its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical
notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgements perfectly coincides with
this and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example:
May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily
distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have: Whether it
is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise? The former may undoubtedly
of be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough