Fundamental Principals of the Metaphysic of Morals | Page 5

reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions which
the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct,
would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been
attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have
been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have served it
to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself
thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its
desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of
nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into
practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself

the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken
on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would
have entrusted both to instinct.
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate
purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of
true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid
enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in
the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all
the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common
luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of
the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their
shoulders. rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising,
the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do
not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the
judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages
which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would
even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with
which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea
that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness,
reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme
condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.
For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and
the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an
end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since,
nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have
influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her
capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will,
not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was
absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must
be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness.
Under these circumstances, there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the
fact that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional
purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the
second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to
nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes the
establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this
purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the
attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that
this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.
We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for
itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the
sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and
which in estimating the value of