Fundamental Principals of the Metaphysic of Morals | Page 4

FIRST SECTION. Transition from the common rational knowledge of morality to the
philosophical.

2 SECOND SECTION. Transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysic of
morals.

3 THIRD SECTION. Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the critique of the pure
practical reason.
SEC_1
FIRST SECTION

TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called
good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the
other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution,
perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many
respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the
will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called
character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even
health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called
happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the
influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting
and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a
pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial
rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even

of being worthy of happiness.
There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may
facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always
presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and
does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and
passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even
seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from
deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so
unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they
may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more
dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have
been without it.
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the
attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in
itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought
about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even
if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision
of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if
with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the
good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power),
then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole
value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from
this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more
conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not
yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.
There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will,
in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of
even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be
the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose
of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this
idea from this point of view.
In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the
purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose
will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being
which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its
welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement
in selecting the