Ethics, part 5 | Page 6

accredited to virtue,
when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires,
whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much
from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.). Than this remedy for

the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which
consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being
within our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power
save that of thinking and of forming, adequate ideas, as we have shown
above (III:iii.).
Prop.V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply, and
not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions
being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Proof.- An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is
greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III:xlix.),
and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as
possible, or contingent (IV:xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be
nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of
the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II:xxxv.Note);
therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is,
other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards
what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the
greatest of all. Q.E.D.
Prop.VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less
subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.
Proof.- The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.) and to
be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes;
therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that
it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III:xlviii.) feels
less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.
Note.- The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to
particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the
greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also
testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is
mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not
by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an
infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it
passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most
people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant,
everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be
looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency
in Nature; and we may note several other instances of the same sort.

Prop.VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take
account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to
particular objects that we regard as absent.
Proof.- We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion
wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by
another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II:xvii.).
Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard
as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities
and power (IV:vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some
sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
external cause (IV:ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is
necessarily referred to the common properties of things (see the def. of
reason in II:xl.Note.ii.), which we always regard as present (for there
can be nothing to exclude their present existence), and which we
always conceive in the same manner (II:xxxviii.). Wherefore an
emotion of this kind always remains the same; and consequently
(V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto and are not kept going
by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more
and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.
Prop.VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of
simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
Proof.- Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
(III:vii.): therefore (IV:v.), in proportion to the increased number of
simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes
stronger. Q.E.D.
Note.- This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii.
Prop.IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes
which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less
hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each
of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion
attributable to fewer causes or to